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ABSTRACT

Kent* Philip F . , M . A . , Spring 1978

History

Problems of Perception in Diplomacy: The Decisions to Intervene
in Korea and Vietnam (175 pp.)
Director:

Paul Gordon Lauren

This work is an analysis of the perceptions of the leading
officials of the administrations from President Truman to Presi
dent Johnson, 1945 to 1965. Specifically, the study centers on
how these perceptions influenced the decisions by the government
of the United States to intervene in Korea and Vietnam. This
involves an examination of the perceptions of key administration
officials in respect to the lessons of the past, the adversaries
of America, particularly the Soviet Union and the communist world,
and finally their view of America's role in the international
political system.
In conclusion, America's perceptions regarding the lessons of
Munich and the Cold War, its fear of a global and monolithic
communist threat, and its self-image of the United States as
the leader of the free world were decisive factors which led to
intervention in both the Korean and Vietnamese wars.
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PREFACE
In a time of turmoil like the present,
historians who deal in praise or blame
are in danger of sounding shrill. Of
a major scholarly movement that claims
the function of a moral judgment we are
entitled to ask for a widening, not a
mere reversal of perspectives; an en
richment of our humanity, not a mere
confirmation of our likes and dislikes.
This in turn calls for a certain char
ity: a blend of sympathy and distance,
a combination of emphatic identification
with analytical detachment.*
John Higham 1968
The study of the American interventions in Korea and
Vietnam deserves and demands no less a standard of excel
lence than that espoused by John Higham.

When analyzing

such recent and traumatic conflicts, the penchant to praise
or blame in shrill sounds is accentuated and the likelihood
that the bulk of commentary will be comprised of emotional
and self-serving polemics is dramatically increased.
is especially true in respect to Korea and Vietnam.

This
Many

historians therefore contend that both conflicts, particu
larly Vietnam, are subjects conducive to historical analysis.
Yet, despite the pervasive accusation of being high-minded
journalism at best, serious study of the era has begun.
Douglas MacArthur as cited in John Higham, Writing
American History: Essays on Modern Scholarship (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1970), p. 168.
1

2
This thesis is no attempt at a definitive work of the
two conflicts, encompassing all the elements such an ef
fort would entail.

Rather, its goal is more modest:

to

investigate the perceptions•of the key officials of the
administrations from Harry S. Truman through Lyndon B.
Johnson.

Consequently little attention, if any, will be

given to deserving topics.

The study does not include,

for example, an analysis of how domestic and bureaucratic
politics shaped White House policy.

2

To ascertain why

American decision makers determined that intervention in
these remote areas of the world was necessary.

I concen

trated on how American statesmen perceived reality and on
how this subsequently shaped their behavior,
Originally my motivation derived impetus from a yearn
ing to understand why the Vietnam War, the most tragic event
'■of my life, ever occurred.

Though not immune to the painful

memories of this era in American history, I strove to detach
?
For a brief but instructive discussion of the role of
bureaucratic politics in the formulation of foreign policy,
see William B. Quant, Decade of Decisions: American Policy
Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 1967-1976 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1977), pp. 24-28. Also see
Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First
Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in
France and Germany (Stanford; Hoover institution Press, 1976),
pp. 228-234, and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual
Analysis (London: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 101-146.
Regarding bureaucratic politics in respect to Vietnam, see
Robert L. Gallucci, Neither Peace nor Honor: The Politics of
American Military Policy in Vietnam (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 197 5), and Jeffrey Race, "Vietnam Interven
tion: Systematic Distortion in Policy-Making," Armed Forces
and Society 3 (May 1976):377-396.

ray personal beliefs and emotions from my study of the wars;
a goal not easily attained and ultimately elusive.

I won

dered if a member of the generation who reached political
maturity during the 1960s could understand, though not neces
sarily agree with, the actions of another generation--actions
which directly affected my personal life.

Our frame of refer

ences were so dissimilar; their Munich was my Gulf of Tonkin,
their Pearl Harbor my Kent and Jackson State.

To avoid the

pitfalls of many of the studies on Vietnam, I decided to dis
cover how these men from 1945 to 1965 viewed the problems of
their time.
Therefore X have not attempted to write an historical
account from the perspective of my generation.

In fact, I

always suspected that Carl Becker's dictum that every gen
eration must write its own history is analogous to General
Motors' policy of planned obsolescence.

If history's con»

tributions are to be lasting then let us not restrict it
solely to the preoccupations of each generation.

Hopefully

my minor effort will be a worthy contribution to the his
torian's attempt to unravel the mysteries of the Korean and
Vietnamese conflicts.

CHAPTER I
PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY:
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE
DECISION TO INTERVENE IN KOREA
The decision of President Truman
on June 27 lighted into flame a lamp
of hope throughout Asia that was
burning dimly toward extinction.
It
marked for the Far East the focal and
turning point in this area struggling
for freedom.1
Douglas MacArthur
During a press conference, on November 30, 1950,
President Harry S. Truman delivered the following state
ment :
The forces of the United Nations are in
Korea to put down an aggression that
threatens not only the whole fabric of the
United Nations, but all human hopes of
peace and justice.
If the United Nations
yields to the forces of aggression, no
nation will be safe or secure. If aggres
sion is successful in Korea, we can expect
it to spread throughout Asia and Europe to
this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services
and Committee on Foreign Relations, To Conduct an Inquiry
into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts
Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur from his Assignment in That Area. 82nd Cong.,
1st sess., 1951, 1:81.
[Hereafter cited as the MacArthur
Hearings.]
4

5
for our own national security and
survival.^
To preserve the sanctity of the United Nations, to resist
communist aggression, and to uphold and maintain the peace
and security of the nation and the free world:

these were

the stated reasons justifying American military intervention
in Korea.

3

Why did Truman and the vast majority of Americans

perceive that intervention in Korea was necessary?

Before

discussing the Korean decision one must place Korea and the
events unfolding during the summer of 1950 in their histori
cal context.
The contemporary reader, quite likely, greets Truman's
rationale with skepticism.

To the citizen who, since po

litical maturity, was inudated with continuous warnings of
the dangers of communism, the declaration's sense of urgency
is lost.

The statement seems typical of the bloated and

deceptive rhetoric of the "Imperial Presidency."

If one

could temporarily forget the events of the last quarter
century, however, then the statement ceases to be typical
and becomes a remarkable and extraordinary historical docu
ment .
2
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Volume Two: Years of Trial
and Hope. 2 vols. (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1956), 2:389.
3
Throughout the paper communism will be spelled with
a small c, except when directly quoting other sources.
Vietnam will appear as just cited, except when directly
quoting other sources.

6
Just ten years prior to America's intervention in
Korea, many Americans were reluctant to aid Britain in its
lone struggle against the greatest threat known to Western
civilization.

Indeed, for President Franklin Delano

Roosevelt to have taken up the torch of the free world
against Nazi aggression in 1940 would have constituted
political suicide.

Ten years later, however, America would

assume far wider world responsibilities and lead the fight
against aggression, in Korea, which became "the symbol of
the resistence of a united humanity against, aggression." 4
What had transpired during those ten years that compelled
the American public and its leaders to react to hostilities
in Korea with almost the same intensity as they had to the
tragic events of December 7, 1941?

Why had a country which

most Americans could not locate on a map become vital to
American security?

Had the world changed that drastically?
1. The Cold War

Truman's reminiscence of a trip to Pearl Harbor in 1950
captured the bewilderment of a generation:

"I seemed to

have passed from one epoch of history into another, and yet
c
1941 was less than ten years away."
As the destruction of
war swept across the continent of Europe, the world had
undergone a period of enormous change and turmoil.
4
Truman, Memoirs, 2:368.
5Ibid., 2:364.

The

7
postwar world bore little resemblance to the world of the
1930s.

From the ashes of war a new international system

emerged, but the swift decline of the familiar world order
mystified mere mortals.
of civilization.

Europe was no longer the center

The process of European disintegration,

initiated with the Great War, culminated with the devasta
tion of World War II.

Amidst a war-torn Europe, two

burgeoning world powers faced each other across an "Iron
Curtain."
Men wondered if these two powers could cooperate in an
effort to facilitate world peace.

Although both countries

espoused exclusive and antagonistic ideologies, cherished
opposing ideals, and were committed to divergent security
interests, it was hoped that these differences could be
reconciled.

But the areas of controversy underlying these

two world viewpoints were seldom compatible or amenable to
compromise.

Often the goals of each country were conflict’-

ing, their disagreements fundamental, and all the aspirations
and hopes of a war-weary world could not transcend that in
escapable reality.

Truman pursued Roosevelt's policy of

utilizing the Grand Alliance as an instrument of world peace,
but the crises over Poland, Iran, Germany, and Greece dealt
a fatal blow to hopes of a continued collaboration with the
Soviet Union.

The Grand Alliance became a phantom, a relic

of the past, a reminder of what might have been.

By 1947

American leaders consciously confronted the Soviets, and

8
the policy of cooperation was transformed to a policy of
containment.^

To use the terminology of another Crisis,

the two powers were eyeball to eyeball.

It would be years

before either blinked.
The Soviets and Americans became so obsessed with each
other that their visions of the world excluded other consid
erations.

One can picture the extremity that the confronta

tion took by imagining two people spying through a keyhole
on each other.

Each saw the opposite of themselves, per

ceiving what John Stoessinger calls "mirror devil images,"
of threats to their values and survival.

7

The Soviets and

Americans, like Narcissus, became possessed by the image
that they gazed upon.

Unlike Narcissus, however, the antag

onist's wills were paralyzed not by love, but by a pervasive
and profound fear.

These mutual fears and suspicions ac

quired a peculiar dynamic of their own as the bipolar world
perspective hardened and crystallized.

The eloquent spokes

man of the Truman Administration, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, aptly described this perspective:

^See John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Ori
gins of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1972), especially chapters 1, 2, 7, and 9. For the
Soviet perspective see Adam A. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and his
Era (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), especially chapters
12 and 13. But one should be cautioned that Stalin's per
ceptions cannot be appreciated fully unless one reads the
entire work.
7
John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China.
Russia and America, 2nd edition (New York: Random House,
1975), pp. 79-85.

9
Only two great powers remain in the
world . . . the United States and the
Soviet Union. We have arrived at a
situation unparalleled since ancient
times. Not since Rome and Carthage
had there been such a polarization of
power on this earth. Moreover, the two
great powers were divided by an un
bridgeable ideological chasm. . . .
And it was clear that the Soviet Union
was aggressive and expanding. . . . It
was a matter of building our own se
curity and safeguarding freedom by
strengthening free people against Com
munist aggression and subversion. We
had the choice . . . of acting with
energy to meet this situation or losing
by default.®
Truman and Acheson reasoned that as the leader of the free
world, America was engaged in a struggle of survival with
the Soviet Union.

The Soviets would take advantage of the

chaos and weakness of the postwar era to pursue its ambitions
of global expansion.

Only the resolute opposition of the

United States could contain the spread of Soviet communism.

9

O

Dean Acheson, as cited in Seymor Brown, The Faces of
Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy
from Truman to Johnson" (New York: Columbia University Press,
1968), pp. 40-41. An excerpt from Acheson1s briefing to
Congressional leaders to enlist their support for the Truman
Doctrine.
9
David McLellan, "The Operational Code* Approach to
the Study of Political Leaders: Dean Acheson's Philosophi
cal and Instrumental Beliefs,” Canadian Journal of Political
Science 4 (March 1971):57-59, and Glen D. Paige, The Korean
Decision June 24-30, 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 1968).
See p. 54 in Paige, indicating that Truman*s earlier senti
ment was evolving into a policy (letter to Byrnes, January 5,
1945): "Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong
language another war is in the making. Only one language do
they understand - 'how many divisions have you?*"

10
It is within this historical context that the Korean
decision must be placed if it is to be properly understood.
In a world controlled by two mutually hostile countries,
Korea became the symbolic battleground of the Cold War in
1950.

An observation by an American observer in Korea,

Edwin W. Pauley, on June 22, 1946, now has a prophetic
ring:
While Korea is a small country, and in terms
of our total military strength is a small
responsibility, it is an ideological battle-
ground upon which our entire success in Asia
may depend.
It is here where a test will be
made of whether a democratic competitive
system can be adapted to meet the challenge
of a defeated feudalism, or whether some
other system, i.e., Communism will become
stronger.10
Truman's conviction that America must take the lead in the
postwar era was aided by his belief in the necessity of a
strong chief executive.
2. Truman's Conception of Power
Truman's conviction that a President must vigorously
use his power combined, with his vision of America's role in
world politics to exercise a profound influence upon the
10

Edwin W. Pauley, as cited in Truman, Memoirs, 2:321.
For additional evidence that prior to June 24, 1950, Korea
was considered militarily insignificant, see Edwin C. Hoyt,
"The United States Reaction to the North Korean Attack: A
Study of the Principles of the United Nations Charter as a
Factor in American Policy Making," American Journal of Inter
national Law 55 (January 1961):52, and Ernest R. May, "Les
sons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American
Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 197 2).

11
Korean decision.

Truman envisioned an administration of

positive action guided by resolute presidential leadership.
Man's greatest achievement and noblest profession was poli
tics and Truman's faith in the efficacy of politics to
guarantee man's security never wavered.

11

His love for

politics and strong sense of duty bolstered Truman's belief
that the President guarded the sacred trust of the people.
Thus whenever he perceived the security and welfare of the
American people to be threatened, Truman felt compelled to
act decisively.

As the highest elected representative of

all the American people, the president was morally obligated
to use the power necessary to ensure the future safety of
the United States.

In times of national emergency or inter

national crisis, "the President must use whatever power the
Constitution does not expressedly deny him."

12

Truman's

slogan that the "Buck Stops Here" was indicative of his cer
tainty that the President must be the final arbitrator of
all issues confronting the American people.

Since Truman

encouraged individual initiative by his cabinet, the views
of his chief advisers were crucial.

In particular, Dean

Acheson exercised his authority in foreign affairs.
^Raymond G. O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman: New Dimensions
of Power," in Powers of the President in Foreign Affairs
1945-1965 Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower. John F.
Kennedy. Lyndon B. Johnson, ed. Edgar E. Robinson (California:
Lederer, Street and Zues Co., 1966), pp. 23-26. See Paige,
Korean Decision, pp. 21-25.
^2Truman, Memoirs, 2:471.

12
The State Department under Acheson enjoyed a role of
being chief policy maker in world politics during Truman's
tenure.

In Acheson, Truman found a trusted aide to assist

him with his inexperience in foreign affairs.

A man of

strong convictions, Acheson believed that power, not
principle, was the driving force in global affairs.

Prin-r

ciples, regardless of their intrinsic and moral worth, were
not self-enforcing.

Therefore in order to protect its ideals

and interests, the United States must be willing to use its
power if necessary.

Acheson shared Truman's profound mis

trust of the Soviets and believed that Russia represented
the greatest threat to world peace.

13

Together Truman and

Acheson formed an effective team.
Truman's reading of history reinforced these convictions
that America's mission and security were best served when a
strong president manned the helm.

His use of history gives

insight into an essential facet of Truman’s character.
Oliver Wendell Holmes's dictum that a page of history is
“I A

worth a volume of logic was a favorite of Truman's:

"I had

trained myself to look back into history for precedents be
cause instinctively I sought perspective in the span of his
tory for the decisions I had to make.

That is why I read and

13

John Lewis Gaddis, "Harry S. Truman and the Origins of
Containment," in American Foreign Policy Makers From Beniamin
Franklin to Henry Kissinger, ed. Frank J. Merli (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), pp. 508-509.
"^O'Conner, "Harry S . Truman," p. 24.

13
re-read history.

Most o£ the problems a president has to

face have their roots in the past."

15

Truman thought his

tory an unambiguous moral teacher, whose lessons must be
deciphered if the pitfalls and tragedies of the past were
to be averted.
Strong presidential leadership, though crucial, would
be wasted if America neglected its world obligations.

The

United States was and must remain "a strong bulwark of
freedom" against communist encroachment.

17

Truman affirmed

that "throughout the world our name stands for a world based
on principles of law and order," and thus obligated the
United States to lead the crusade against Soviet designs of
world domination.

18

Yet America’s strength relied upon more

than just ethical and spiritual strength.

Its moral might

was sustained by America’s prestige, which Acheson desig
nated as "the shadow cast by its power, which is of great
deterrence power."

19

America symbolized the moral strength

of the free world, but it was its military capabilities
which committed it to contain the Soviet threat to world
peace.

Armed with his conception of a strong presidency,

15

Harry S. Truman, as cited in ibid.
1f%
Paige, Korean Decision, pp. 21-25.
17Ibid., p. 52.
^Truman, Memoirs, 2:428.
19

Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in
the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
1969) , p. 405.

14
Truman took the necessary steps to ensure the world that
America would fulfill its responsibilities.

One authority

contends that ''Truman combined a vision of America's role
with a firm notion of the President's role in office." 20
The invasion of South Korea challenged Truman's image of
America and he resolved to use the inherent powers of the
office to thwart the threat.

Cold War ideology, Truman's

and Acheson's world view, and the belief in decisive action
provide the general framework in which the events of Korea
were perceived.
3. War in Korea
The June 24, 1950 invasion of South Korea was greeted
by the Truman administration with dismay and shock.

Though

no contingency plan for such an occurrence existed, within
the week Truman authorized U. S. military troops to combat
communist aggression in Korea.
Truman's decision included:

The factors which shaped

his perceptions of the lessons

of the immediate past, the concern for a viable collective
security, the fear of the consequences if unprovoked aggres
sion went unchecked, and the belief that the invasion rep
resented the first step in a Soviet plan for world expansion
Truman, as did most of his administration, reached po
litical maturity during the late 1930s, a decade rich with
profound but costly political lessons.
70

For many Americans

O'Connor, "Harry S. Truman," p. 2 5.

15
those ten years contained vivid and painful memories.

The

aggressions of the totalitarian regimes, the subsequent
failure of Western democracy to unite against these acts,
and the tragic war that followed, collectively inflicted
a permanent scar and reminder upon the consciousness of a
generation.

Never again would evil be mitigated.

Never

again would the Western democracies fail to resist unwanton
aggression and thereby plunge the world into the horrors of
another war.

By embracing a policy of appeasement in the

past the West had abdicated its responsibilities and world
chaos, suffering and torment followed on an unprecedented
scale.

The invasion of Korea tapped those memories and

Truman vowed that it would not happen again:
Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler,
Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten,
fifteen, and twenty years earlier.
I felt
certain . . . if this was allowed to go un
challenged it would mean a third world war.
It was also clear to me that the foundations
and the principles of the United Nations
were at stake unless this unprovoked attack
on Korea could be stopped.21
If future wars were to be avoided and world peace ensured,
then the major powers, especially the United States, must
maintain a constant vigilance against breaches of world
order.
This was a deeply held conviction of Truman’s; Pearl
Harbor had eliminated any trace of isolationist sentiment.

22

^Truman, Memoirs, 2:333.
22

In 1934, when Truman was a freshman Senator, he sup
ported the Neutrality Acts. See May, ,fLessons
pp. 83-86.

16
After December 7, 1941, Truman became an avid proponent of
collective security and internationalism as indicated by an
excerpt of a Senate speech made on November 2, 1943:
I am just as sure as I can be that this World
War is the result of the 1919-1920 isolation
ist attitude, and I am equally sure that
another and worse war will follow this one,
unless the United Nations and allies and all
other sovereign nations decide to work
together for peace as they are working for
victory.23
Truman, as President, strengthened Roosevelt's commitment to
an international body dedicated to the preservation of world
peace.

By reconciling national and supranational interests,

Truman convinced the American people that support of the
A A

United Nations served their best interests.

Assured that

the failure of the League of Nations had rested upon the
shoulders of the major powers--and especially the United
States--Truman utilized the resources of his office to garner
congressional and public support for the United Nations.

The

ideals of the United Nations could not stand alone against
aggression; the major powers must assert their wills if these
ideals were to remain effective standards of international
behavior.

Truman conveyed his dedication to the United

Nations in a despondent whisper at the first Blair House

23

Harry S. Truman, as cited in O'Connor, "Harry S.
Truman," p. 60.
2^Ibid., pp. 60-64. O'Connor states on p. 18 that
"Truman's concept of presidential responsibilities and na
tional obligation to this organization contributed vastly
to its success."

17
Conference on Korea, "We can't let the UN down!"

25

Not only did the Korean invasion conjure up apprehen
sions regarding appeasement and the failure of collective
security, it also raised the spectre of Soviet and com
munist expansion.

That the Soviets instigated the attack

the Truman Administration never doubted.

With their bi

polar world perspective American officials confidently
reasoned that "It seems close to certain that the attack
had been mounted, supplied, and instigated by the Soviet
Union."

26

Edward A. Bennet, Assistant Secretary of State

for Public Relations, categorized the relationship between
Russia and North Korea as analogous to the one between
"Walt Disney and Donald Duck."^
25Harry S. Truman, as cited in Paige. Korean Decision,
p. 125. See p. 18 for Truman's impassioned defense of the
UN, This occurred on June 25, 1950, in response to Dean
Acheson's failure to mention the UN during a briefing to
Congress on the Korean invasion.
'7
Acheson, Creation, p. 405.
27
Edward A. Bennet, as cited in Paige, Korean Decision,
p. 188. It should be pointed out that Truman's interpreta
tion of the origins of the Korean War is not the only one.
See Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang,
Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York:
The Free Press, 1975), pp. 102-136. Simons argues that the
government of North Korea was neither a Soviet puppet nor the
instrument of a monolithic communist bloc. Though the Soviets
supported the North Koreans, the timing of the war was due to
internal circumstances and the Korean aspiration of unifica
tion. Therefore the conflict in essence was a civil war. For
two other interpretations which stress the civil war interpre
tation, see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The
World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972), pp. 565-600. See also I. F.
Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1952).
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Prior to the Korean crisis, it had not been expected
the Soviets would engage in overt operations to further
their ambition of world domination, let alone invade South
Korea.

A New York Times editorial reflected the govern

ment 's attitude by stating that "while the Russians would
continue trying to gain their ends by indirect aggression
through Communist parties, they would hesitate to use
force."

28

The recent invasion of Korea would prompt a

reappraisal of that basic tenet.

Hence, Korea marked a

turning point regarding American perceptions of the Soviet
Union and of the nature of the Cold War.

No longer was it

perceived that the Soviets were content to rely primarily
upon deceitful yet peaceful means; they were now willing to
employ armed force to achieve their objectives. 29

A speech

by Truman in San Francisco on October 17, 1950, demonstrates
how the Soviet aggression affected Washington's attitude.
"So long as they persist in maintaining these forces and in
using them to intimidate other countries," he said, "the
free men of the world have but one choice if they are to remain free.

They must oppose strength with strength."

30

The invasion of Korea raised a number of difficult and
28

Alexander L. George, "American Policy Making and the
North Korean Invasion," World Politics 7 (January 1955):210.
29

Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint; Canada.
the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: Toronto Uni^
versity Press, 1974), pp. 29-30.
Truman, Memoirs, 2:320.
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perplexing questions.

The participants of the Blair House

Conferences pondered why the Soviets acted and how the
attack fit their broader plans.

Was it the beginning of

a general war or merely a probing action, a Soviet hope
for a quick and painless victory?

Was it a diversionary

tactic with Europe the ultimate target, or a test of American prestige and will?

31

Truman's answers to these ques

tions would determine the course of action he would take.
Truman perceived the invasion as a test of America's
will with the ultimate target being Western Europe.

Korea

would transform the Cold War into a global conflict, but
Europe remained the primary concern of key administration
officials.

Truman reflected:

From the very beginning of the Korean ac
tion I had always looked at it as a Russian
maneuver, as a part of the Kremlin's plan
to destroy the unity of the free world.
NATO, the Russians knew, would succeed only
if the United States took part in the de
fense of Europe.52
The key to world peace was Europe, therefore the Soviets hoped
to weaken NATO by diverting American energy in Korea.

Truman

stated that "the first commandment of Soviet foreign policy
31

George, "American Policy Making," pp. 210-215. See
Paige, Korean Decision, pp. 115, 133-136.
See p. 134 for evi
dence of American uncertainty over Soviet intent: State Depart
ment world-wide alert, "Possible that Korea is only the first
series of coordinated actions. . . . Maintain utmost vigilance
and report immediately any positive or negative information;"
and Morton H. Halperin, "The Limiting Process in the Korean
War," Political Science Quarterly 78 (March 1963):16-20.
3?
Truman, Memoirs, 2:437.
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has always been to divide the enemies of the Soviet Union,
and the unity that United States leadership had created in
Europe was the most important target for world communism*s
attack."

33

With Soviet aggression Korea became "the test

of all the talk of the last five years of collective se-*
curity."34
The attack on South Korea was perceived as an ominous
act of aggression by the Soviets testing America’s prestige,
threatening the system of collective security, and upsetting
the foundations of world order and peace.

Truman concluded

that decisive, resolute action was needed to avoid another
world war.

Once again, as in the 1930s, an ambitious power

confronted the United States and the free world with a
challenge that threatened its very existence.

The decade

symbolized by Munich had proven forever the futility of
appeasement.

Given Truman’s intellectual perspective and

his interpretation of recent events, the president reasoned
that only one viable option was opened to him. After weigh
ing the alternatives, Truman responded with characteristic
resoluteness:
I prayed that there might be some way
other than swift military action to meet
this Communist aggression, for I knew the
awful sacrifices in life and suffering it
would take to resist it. But there was
only one choice facing the free world resistance or capitulation to Communist
33Ibid., 2:380.
34Ibid., 2:344.
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military aggression.
It was my belief
that if this aggression in Korea went un
challenged, as aggression in Manchuria in
1931 and Ethiopia in 1934 had gone un
challenged, the world was certain to
plunge into another world war.
This was the same kind of challenge
Hitler flaunted in the face of the rest
of the world when he crossed the borders
of Austria and Czechoslavakia. The free
world failed then to meet the challenge,
and World War II was the result. This
time the free nations - the United Na
tions - were quick to sense the new dan
ger to world peace. The United Nations
was born out of the ashes of two world
wars and organized for the very purpose
of dealing with aggression wherever it
threatened to break out or actually
occurred.
That is why the United Nations responded
with such spontaneity and swiftness. This
was the first time in the history of the
world that there was international ma
chinery to deal with those who would re
sort to war as a means of imposing their
will or systems on other people.35
The lessons of the thirties had been learned, Korea would
not be the Munich of the fifties.

"We will not yield to

aggression," Truman vowed, "appeasement of evil is not the
road to peace."3**
35

Ibid., 2:463. For similar statements by world leaders
see Stairs, Diplomacy of Constraint, pp. 34-35, Trygve Lie,
Secretary General of the UN: "this to me was clear-cut aggres
sion . . . which reminded me of the Nazi invasion of Norway because this was aggression against a 'creation' of the United
Nations." See Paige, Korean Decision, p. 200, Clement Atlee:
"The situation is of undoubted gravity, but I am certain that
there will be no disagreement, after our bitter experiences
in the past 35 years, that the salvation of all is dependent
on prompt and effective measures to arrest aggression wherever
it may occur. . . . This is naked aggression and it must be
checked."
3^Truman, Memoirs, 2:428.

22
Communist aggression in Korea constituted a political
and legal threat to America.

If the United States acquiesced

in Korea, then its prestige would be dealt a potentially
lethal blow.

If the illegal breach of international peace

was permitted, then the legitimacy of the United Nations and
the principle of collective security would be undermined.

37

Truman felt compelled to act with decisive force since a
policy of inaction could prove too costly.

As scholar

Alexander George contends, "the decision to oppose the
North Koreans was motivated by a fear of the consequences
of inaction and was influenced by considerations which
stemmed from uncertain interpretations of broader Soviet
38
strategic intentions behind the North Korean attack."
From the perspective of Truman and his advisers intervention
was the necessary and proper course of action.

Everyone

readily agreed to support "whatever had to be done to meet
this aggression."

39

Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup

maintained that there was a "hard core of resolve" to take
the action necessary to avoid the intolerable evil of ap
peasement.^®
The conviction of Truman's that unchecked Soviet

■^Hoyt, "The United States Reaction," pp. 54-55.
38
39

George, "American Policy Making," p. 222.
Truman, Memoirs, 2:344.

^°Philip C. Jessup, as cited in Paige, Korean Decision,
p. 143,
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aggression endangered the security of Western Europe, Asia,
and the viability of the United Nations as an instrument of
peace weighed heavily among the factors contributing to the
Korean decision:

"The attack on Korea was . . .

a challenge

to the whole system of collective security, not only in the
Far East, but everywhere in the world. . . . This was a test
which would decide whether our collective system would survive or crumble."

41

A year after the attack on Korea,

Truman restated to Congress his justification of interven
tion:
Our action in the crisis was motivated by
our deep conviction of the importance of
the international security system and of
the principles of the Charter.
I was con
vinced then, and I am convinced now, that
to have ignored the appeal of Korea for
aid, to have stood aside from the assault
upon the Charter, would have meant the end
of the United Nations as a shield against
aggression.42
The Soviet Union and its client state North Korea must
be deterred in Korea, otherwise inaction would encourage the
launching of other attacks thus increasing the likelihood of
another world conflagration*

Acheson justified the firm re

sponse since if the Soviets could "utilize their satellites
as stooges to take aggressive action without serious danger
of becoming involved themselves, they will be likely to em-

41Ibid., p. 175.
4^Harry S. Truman, as cited in Hoyt, "The United States
Reaction," p. 54.
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employ this device with increasing boldness."

43

The events

of the recent past reinforced the lessons of the 1930s and
hardened the administration's resolve in the face of aggres
sion.
If Hitler's unrestrained ambition proved the futility
of appeasement, then Stalin's recent behavior confirmed the
wisdom of a tough stance.

When confronted in Iran, Berlin

and Greece the Soviets drew back, therefore they would re
spond realistically to American resolve.

Pointing to a map

on the morning of June 26, Truman analyzed the situation in
Korea, "This is the Greece of the Far East.
44
enough there won't be any next step." .

If we are tough

He later confided to

his advisers "that what was developing in Korea seemed to me
like a repetition on a larger scale of what happened in Ber
lin.

The Reds were probing for weakness in our armour; we

had to meet their thrust without getting embroiled in a
45
world-wide war."
The Soviets must not win by default,
aggression could not be rewarded.
As the crisis in Korea deepened, it became painfully
evident that South Korea would succumb to the communist

^Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to the
Embassy in the Soviet Union, June 26, 1950, in U :
. S., Depart^
ment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976) , 7 :177 .
[Hereafter cited as FRUS.]
44
Harry S. Truman, as cited in May, "Lessons", p. 71.
^Truman, Memoirs, 2:337.
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attack.

The Minister at the American Embassy in Paris,

Charles E. Bohlen, sent a dispatch to the Secretary of
State:
This is . . . the first time overt vio
lation of a frontier . . . has occurred
since the end of the war and you may be
sure that all Europeans to say nothing of
the Asiatics are watching to see what the
United States will do. It is a situation
requiring maximum f i r m n e s s . 46
As Dirk Stikker, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, proclaimed,
"all eyes are on A m e r i c a . T r u m a n did not disappoint world
opinion.

On June 30, 1950, in the early morning hours,

Harry S. Truman committed American combat troops to the
peninsula of Korea.
The reasons for American intervention were multiple and
complex.

A leading authority explained Truman's reasoning:

"He wanted to affirm that the U.N, was not a League of Na
tions, that aggression would be met with counterforce, that
'police action' was well worth the cost, that the 'lessons
48
of the 1930s' had been learned."
The lessons were learned,
perhaps too well, perhaps they were ingrained in the American
psyche too deeply.

Now a new element had been added to the

^Minister Charles C. Bohlen (Paris) to Secretary of
State, June 26, 1950, in FRUS 1950, 7:174. Actually the
cable was intended to be read by George Kennan.
^Ambassador Chapin (Amsterdam) to Secretary of State,
June 26, 19 50, in FRUS, 19 50, 7:186.
48
Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1960), p. 126.
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lessons of the past.

This was not just aggression, it was

by the Soviet Union, the leader of the communist world.

The

prestige and survival of the United States, the United Na
tions, and collective security, and the resolve of the forces
of anticommunism were considered well worth the costs and
risks of war.
Given the perception of a bipolar world, with the forces
of Good combating the forces of Evil, Truman’s options were
severely limited.

Truman favored intervention because he

believed the alternatives unacceptable.

Decisive action was

necessary to "demonstrate that aggression will nqt be accepted
by us or by the United Nations and to provide a rallying point
around which the spirits and energies of the free world can be
mobilized to meet the world-wide threat of which the Soviet
Union now poses."

49

The consequences of American inaction

were too horrible to contemplate.

The fear that America would

fail to respond dissipated with Truman's decision.

The

exuberant response by Senator Hubert Humphrey to the Korean
decision represented the sentiment of most Americans:
I believe this is a fatal hour. I believe the
decision the President has made may save the
lives of millions of people, and may ultimately
save the peace of the world. I pray God in all
reverence that all the people will give sup
port to this policy, so that we shall not find
ourselves driven by our indecision into the
cataclysm of a third world war. This may be
the greatest move for peace in the twentieth
century.50
49

Truman, Memoirs, 2:435.

^Hubert Humphrey, as cited in Paige, Korean Decision, p. 197.
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Humphrey failed to anticipate the consequences of the Ameri
can intervention in Korea.
The Korean War forced a reappraisal of the world situa
tion and areas of prior insignificance now were perceived as
critical to America’s strategic interests.

51

If other

Koreas were to be prevented, then America must strengthen
its position throughout the world.

Truman shared his

thoughts concerning the significance of Korea with British
Prime Minister Clement Atlee; in Truman's opinion ’’the prob
lem we were facing was part of a pattern.

Aftbr Korea, it
52
would be Indo-China, then Hong Kong, then Malaya.”
For
now the administration was preoccupied with the prosecution
of the Korean War:

As the Ambassador to the Soviet Union

wrote to the Secretary of State; "the issue has been put to
the test of the battle and [the] entire world is watching
and waiting for the results of this test.”

53

^Brown, Faces of Power, p. 55.
5?
Truman, Memoirs, 2:399.
53
Ambassador Kirk (Moscow) to the Secretary of State,
July 1, 1950, in FRUS, 19 50, 7:278.

CHAPTER II
PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY:
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE
PROSECUTION OF THE KOREAN WAR
Plainly, the government has moved
into an area where there is a reluc
tance to recognize the finer dis
tinctions of the psychology of our
adversaries, for the reason that
movement in this sphere of specula
tion is all too undependable, too
relative, and too subtle to be com
fortable or tolerable to people who
feel themselves confronted with the
grim responsibility of recommending
decisions which may mean war or
peace.
George F. Kennan1
"One of the most terrible disasters that has occurred
to American foreign policy and certainly . . . the greatest
2
disaster which occurred to the Truman Administration."
These are the words that Dean Acheson once used to describe
the Chinese intervention in Korea.

How an initial American

policy of restraint in the Korean War was transformed and
■^George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1940, 2 vols. (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1967), 1:499.
2Dean Acheson, as cited in Barton Bernstein, "The
Policy of Risk: Crossing the 38th Parallel to the Yalu,"
Foreign Service Journal 54 (March 1977): 29.
28

29
expanded to provoke such Chinese intervention will be the
subject of this chapter.
1. A Policy of Restraint
Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea,
caution, restraint, and uncertainty characterized the admin
istration's prosecution of the conflict.

Washington's

apprehension about its own capabilities and Soviet inten
tions, plus its firm resolve to localize the hostilities:
these were the dominate factors which shaped American policy.
By August 1950, North Korean troops forced American-led units
back to the Pusan perimeter, a rectangular area bordered by
the Naktong River and the sea of Japan., Washington considered
the situation critical, fearing a bloody war of attrition,
and gravely doubting the likelihood of United Nations success
3
m Korea.
American power faced a severe test. As the Secre
tary of Defense, George Marshall, later commented, "A myth had
been exploded - we were not the powerful nation we were thought
4
to be."
To say the least, America's faith in its military
might had been shaken.
As noted, the actual intentions of the Soviet Union con
stantly concerned and perplexed the administration.5

The

3
David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London: Macmillan,
1964), pp. 43-54.
4
George Marshall, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:371.
^See Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in
American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York:
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North Korean aggression challenged the assumption that neither
the Soviets nor their satellites would resort to force in
peripheral areas of the world, particularly in Asia.

A dis

traught Dean Acheson proclaimed, "The attack upon Korea makes
it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the
use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now
use armed invasion and w a r . T r u m a n and his closest advisers
surmised that either the Kremlin hoped in Korea to demonstrate
American impotence, thereby destroying the collective security
system in the process or that the Soviets wanted to entangle
the United States in an indecisive yet costly theatre of war.
According to historian Gaddis Smith, "Acheson was convinced
that the North Korean attack was part of a ’grand design1
whose ultimate purpose was to weaken the West and upset the
balance in the most important of all theatres - Europe."
Nevertheless, as the comment by Chief of Staff Omar Bradley
Columbia University Press, 1974), especially chapter two for
a thorough discussion of possible interpretations of the
actual intentions of the Soviets. The interpretation favored
is that the Soviets perceived action in Korea as a low-risk
venture, with limited goals, and not part of a plan of world
conquest. See also Gaddis, "Origins of Containment," where
Gaddis contends that though Stalin's goals were limited, one
must qualify the theory by acknowledging that except for
Truman's containment policy and intervention, his aims may
have become more ambitious. Refer to footnote 27 in chapter
one.
^Dean Acheson, as cited in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The
American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, vol. 16:
Dean Acheson, by Gaddis Smith (New York: Cooper Square Pub
lications , Inc., 1972), p, 185.
7Ibid., p. 189.
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indicates, Soviet designs continued to mystify high officials
of the administration:

"It is very difficult to try to fathom

the intentions of the Soviet Government.

They make their de

cisions in a very small group . . . and there is no way of
knowing their intentions."
The anxiety over Soviet intentions led American policy
makers to prosecute the war in such a manner as to diminish
the risk of provoking Soviet intervention.

Marshall stressed

that "we have persistently sought to confine the. conflict to
Korea and to prevent its spreading to a third world war."

9

Truman concurred with this sentiment:
Every decision I made in connection with
the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind:
to prevent a third world war. . . . This
meant that we should not do anything that
would provide the excuse to the Soviets and
plunge the free nations into full-scale
all-out war.10
These pervasive fears, regarding Soviet aims and the possibil
ity of general war, temporarily acted to restrict American
ambitions in Korea.
Early in the conflict Washington's war aims were limited
to the restoration of the status quo ante bellum borders of
Korea.

While addressing the Newspapers Guild on June 29, 1950,

Acheson stated that the United Nations actions were "solely to
be for the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its
8

Omar Bradley, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:755.

9
George Marshall, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:324.
10Truman, Memoirs, 2:345.
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status prior to the invasion by the n o r t h . N e v e r t h e l e s s
the State Department planned for the possibility of a reversal
in the military situation.

On July 22, the Policy Planning

Staff concluded that "from the view of U.S. military commit
ments . . .

we should make every effort to restrict military
12
ground action to the area south of the 38th parallel."

Apparently the risks of war outweighed the advantages of a
final solution.

Crossing the 38th parallel could conceivably

provoke intervention by the Soviets or Chinese thus aborting
13
the United Nations mission to repel aggression.
The Ameri
can posture of restraint and willingness to accept partial
victory was eroded by mounting pressure for unification.

By

July 25, the Planning Staff recommended that any decisions
regarding the course of action as troops approached the 38th
parallel should be deferred until further military and politi
cal plans d e v e l o p e d . D e s p i t e the uncertainty regarding the
outcome of MacArthur*s upcoming offensive, Truman approved
a National Security Council recommendation (NSC 81/1) which
advocated the unification of Korea.

The report stressed that

this desired objective must be abandoned in the likelihood
that either the Soviets or Chinese actively opposed this
■^Acheson, Creation, p. 450.
l2Draft Memorandum Prepared by Policy Planning Staff,
July 22, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:453.
13Ibid., 7:451-4 53.
14Draft Memorandum Prepared by Policy Planning Staff,
July 25, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:473.
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aim.1^

Consequently no final decisions could be made.

With

the phenomenal success by MacArthur the moment of decision
could no longer be delayed.
2. Transformation of War Aims
In the early morning hours of September 15, 1950, United
Nations combat troops, against seemingly insurmountable odds,
successfully secured a beachhead on the shores of Inchon, a
port near the capital of South Korea, Seoul.

MacArthur's

stunning victory turned the tide for American fortunes in
Korea, and dramatically influenced Washington's aspirations
and war aims.

The military and psychological impact of the

Inchon operation revitalized morale in Washington, freeing
the administration from previous constraints which trammeled
America's freedom of action in Korea.

The breakthrough at

Inchon rekindled Washington's sense of mission and power.
With renewed confidence and purpose the United States altered
its earlier and moderate war aims.

As the military initiative

of Inchon gathered momentum, the administration now abandoned
its policy of restoring the status quo.

A more ambitious and

venturesome goal was adopted--the unification of the Korean
peninsula.

■^Report by the National Security Council to the Presi
dent, NSC 81/1: "United States Courses of Action with Respect
to Korea," September 9, 1950* in FRUS, 1950 , 7:712-716. On
September 11, 1950, Truman approved the report and directed
its implementation.
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One should be cautioned against underestimating the im
pact which Inchon had upon the prosecution of the war.

Two

noted and respected scholars depicted the mood after Inchon
as a "period of enormous euphoria at the dramatic reversal
at our military fortunes,"

16

claiming it transformed "not

the war alone but the emotions felt in Washington. .
17
Appetite's arose as the troops went forward."
The mail who
eventually replaced General Douglas MacArthur as United
Nations commander, General Matthew Ridgeway, captured the
electrifying atmosphere:
It is true . . . that our original objec
tive - to repel aggression, to expel the
invaders from South Korea, and restore
peace in the area - underwent drastic
change once the Inchon success had put
us in a position to push north across the
38th parallel. We then tacitly altered
our mission to encompass the occupation
and unification of Korea. - the goal that
had long been the dream of Syngman Rhee
and the prize that beckoned MacArthur.18
The attractive prize also enticed the policy makers in Washing
ton, who were soon blinded by a dream that soon became a
nightmare.

Even Acheson fell victim to the hubris he later

accused MacArthur of monopolizing:
"^Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: The
MacMillan Co., 1973), p. 71.
l^Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 130.
18Matthew P. Ridgeway, The Korean War (New York: Double
day and Co., 1967), p. 230. See also J. Lawton Collins, War
in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1969), p. 277. Collins notes:
"The prestige of General MacArthur after Inchon was so great
that the JCS leaned over backward not to contravene his oc
casional strayings from military directives."
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One must understand the trememdous risks as
sumed by General MacArthur at Inchon, and
the equally great luck that saw him through,
to understand the hubris that led him to
assume even more impossible chances in his
march to the Yalu at a time when his luck and, unhappily, the luck of the United
States - also ran out.19
Yet the Inchon operation also swayed Acheson's behavior.

He

must bear as much responsibility as does MacArthur for
America's turn of fortune in Korea.
The hope of an easy victory gradually eroded the caution
and restraint previously exercised by the administration.
What was once a secondary goal now became the central objec
tive of the war.

Truman declared, "We believe the Koreans

have a right to be free, independent, and united - as they
want to be. . . . The U. S. has no other aim in Korea."

20

On October 6, 1950, Warren Austin, America's Ambassador to
the United Nations, officially sanctified the shift in
American war aims:
In June and July of this year, the Se
curity Council gave all the necessary
military authority to the United Nations'
Commander to repel the aggressor army and
restore peace in Korea.
The United Nations forces have pursued
that task with vigor and some success.
Two things appear necessary to be done
how:'first, to carry out the objectives of
the United Nations in the northern area
where United Nations observers have never
yet had the opportunity to ascertain the
political wishes of the people; second,
19
20

Acheson, Creation, p. 448.
Harry S. Truman, as cited in Smith, Acheson, p. 206.
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to commence forthwith the task of rebuild
ing the shattered Korean economy.
What the United Nations has worked for
since 1947 is stability in Korea - a uni
fied, independent and democratic govern
ment in a sovereign state.21
Soon the repulsion of aggression and the unification of
Korea were taken for granted.
Now the administration devised a policy to strengthen
the United Nations and the free world by shifting its efforts
from repelling the communists to constructing a viable peace.
Dean Acheson forcefully voiced this aspiration:

"Just as

Korea has become the symbol of resistance against aggression,
so can it become the symbol of renewal of life. . . . Out of
the ashes of destruction the United Nations can help the
Korean people to create a society which will have lessons
in it for people everywhere."

22

According to Acheson, Korea

was "the workshop in which the United Nations has the chance
to make the prototype of the kind of world which it wants to
23
make universally."
Underlying all the preparation for a
reconstructed Korea was the assumption that a unified, noncommunist Korea would be secured on the battlefield.

24

21

Warren Austin, "The Korean Case in the General Assembly,"
U. S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 23
(October 23, 1950):648.
[Hereafter cited as Department of
State Bulletin.]
22

Dean Acheson, "Peace the World Wants," Department of
State Bulletin 23 (October 2, 1950):528-529.
23

Dean Acheson, "Events in Korea Deepen Interest m
United Nations," Department of State Bulletin 23 (September
18, 1950) :451.
^Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 127.
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The euphoria following Inchon continued to boost the
prospects for success.

The•confidence inspired by the

triumph spread throughout the administration like wildfire,
with unification acquiring the aura of an accomplished fact.
This self-congratulating attitude contained flaws which di
verted the administration's attention from the storm clouds
that loomed above the horizon.

Dean Acheson later testified;

In the period shortly after the Inchon
landings until the intervention of the
Chinese Communists, it looked as though
both these objectives could be attained.
That is, that the forces of the North
Koreans, who had been attacking South
Korea, were rounded up, destroyed
surrounded, that the country could be
put together. . . .
The United Nations . . . has always
since 1947 had the political objective
of unifying Korea under free and demo
cratic institutions.
Unhappily, the intervention of the
Chinese Communisms threw our forces back
and made it militarily difficult, if
not impossible, to achieve the political
objective.25
Acheson's statement raises a number of critical questions.
Why, for example, did the administration fail to foresee the
likelihood of the Chinese intervention, or

at least adopt

realistic precautions to diminish its occurrence?

Earlier

the administration forbade any action north of the 38th
parallel if Chinese or Soviets even hinted at intervention.
25
26

26

Dean Acheson, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 3:1735.

Truman, Memoirs, 2:359. MacArthur "was to extend his
operations north of the parallel and to make plans for the
occupation of North Korea," but "no ground operations were
to take place north of the parallel in the event of Soviet
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Yet, Truman and his advisers later behaved contrary to their
own warnings.

They persisted in a policy which undermined

American prestige and the goals of the United Nations in
Korea.

To determine why this occurred, the Truman Adminis

tration's perceptions regarding purity of motive, correctness
of policy, and the lure of easy victory must be analyzed.
3. Washington's Hopes and Motivations
Truman, as did his advisers, saw only the noblest of
intentions regarding American objectives in Korea.
The only interest of the United States is
to help carry out these great purposes of
the United Nations in Korea. We have abso
lutely no interest in obtaining any special
position for the United States in Korea, nor
do we wish to retain bases. . . . we would
like to get our armed forces out and back
to their other duties at the earliest
moment consistent with our obligations as
a member of the United N a t i o n s . 27
Hence they failed to anticipate that United Nations policy
could be perceived as hostile behavior by interested parties.
A prevalent characteristic of the administration, historian
John Lewis Gaddis notes, was a "certain casualness about means

or Chinese entry." Earlier Truman had stated that operations
were to cease if there was indication or threat of entry.
See also Secretary of Defense George Marshall to the Presi
dent, September 27, 1950, in FRUS, 19 50, 7:795. Marshall
requested the President approve implementation of the mili
tary aspects of NSC 81/1; "Your approval would permit the
Commander of the United Nations' forces in Korea to conduct
the necessary military options north of the 38th parallel
to destroy North Korean forces."
27

Harry S. Truman, "Preliminary Statement by the Presi
dent," Department of State Bulletin 23 (October 23, 1950):643.
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employed to gain their objectives."

28

These factors give

insight as to why Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC)
eased the restrictions placed upon MacArthur*s freedom of
action.

It further explains the insensitivity displayed

toward Chinese apprehension over the march to the Yalu River,
the mutual border of China and Korea.

If American actions

posed no threat to China, then the administration reasoned,
China lacked a legitimate reason to embark upon a military
campaign against the forces of the United Nations.

Conse

quently, Truman minimized the possibility of a Chinese
counteraction in Korea.

The administration adopted the

attitude expressed by its ambassador to India:

"In the cir

cumstances direct participation of China in Korea seems
beyond range of possibility."

29

If they did intervene, then

Truman concluded they were the dupes of the Soviet Union.
As he stated, "We hope in particular that the people of
China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the
United Nations and against the American people who . . . are
their friends.
Thus confident of victory, the justness of their cause,
and reassured of the improbability of Chinese intervention,
the JCS authorized MacArthur to Cfoss the 38th parallel and
^Gaddis, "Origins of Containment," pp. 512-515.
29

Ambassador Henderson (New Delhi) to Secretary of
State, September 20, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:742.
Truman, Memoirs, 2:354.
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to take steps to unify Korea.

In a communique issued on

September 27, the JCS explicitly warned MacArthur to con
duct operations deep into the north only if "there had
been no entry in North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese
forces, no announcement on intended entry, and no threat"
by the communists to counter militarily United Nations
operations.

31

On October 7, Marshall recalled that the

General Assembly legitimized MacArthur’s mission when it
"adopted a resolution restating the essential objectives
of the United Nations as the establishment of a unified
and democratic government of Korea, and recommending that
all appropriate steps be taken" to accomplish this task.

32

The desire for, and the expectation of, victory gradually
outran all other political considerations.

By October 8,

with the wholehearted endorsement of Truman, Marshall, and
Acheson, the JCS issued another directive to MacArthur:
Hereafter in the event of open or covert
employment anywhere in Korea of major
Chinese Communist units, without prior
announcement, you should continue the
action as long as, in your judgment,
action under your control offers a rea
sonable chance of s u c c e s s . 33

31Ibid., 2:360.
32George Marshall, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:361-362.
33xruman, Memoirs, 2:363.
[My emphasis.]
See also Collins,
The Koyean War, pp. 175-177. On October 17, 1950, UN operations
Order #4 "removed the restrictions on the use of non-Korean
troops North of the Chongju-Kunri-Yongwon-Hamhung line, re
strictions that had been stipulated by JCS instructions of
September 27, 1950." Collins adds that the JCS did not object
to MacArthur’s action.
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The legacy of Inchon and subsequent successes instilled
a confidence in military victory, thus causing Truman to
down play the inherent dangers of the actions of the United
Nations forces.

The President forsook his political judg

ment and sagacity by placing his faith in the military to
achieve an ultimate solution.

Caution was thrown to the

wind when Washington placed final responsibility in the
hands of a man

known to support an operation if its chances

for success were 5 , 0 0 0 - t o - l . T h e hope, perhaps even the
psychological need, for a decisive victory compelled the
United States to pursue a disastrous policy.

In short, a

victory in Korea would achieve all the objectives the admin
istration desired.

The manner by which these goals were to

be attained and the prospect of a clear-cut triumph, further
exhilarated the policy makers in Washington.

This sentiment

was expressed in a Department of Defense memorandum:
In this light, the situation in Korea now
provides the United States and the free
world with the first opportunity to dis
place part of the Soviet orbit.
If the
basic policy of the United States is to
reduce the preponderant power of the USSR
in Asia and elsewhere, then UN-operations
in Korea can set the stage for the non
communist penetration into an area of
Soviet influence.^5
For once, on the battlefields of Korea, the frustrations and
3d
35

Rees, Korea, pp. 81-85.

Draft Memorandum Prepared in Department of Defense:
"United States Course of Action as to Korea," July 31, 1950,
in FRUS, 1950, 7:506.
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statements characteristic of the Cold War could be swept
away with one telling blow against communism.

The only

obstacle to this feat would be intervention by the
Chinese.
4. China Threatens to Intervene
By mid-August the Chinese government had made clear
that American actions threatened the vital interests and
security of mainland China.

According to David Rees, a

scholar of the Korean conflict, "with the success of Inchon,
the whole emphasis of Peking's messages to the West now
changed from propaganda accusations to statements of intent
36
if the 38th parallel was crossed.11
In a cable to the
United Nations on August 20, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou
En-lai emphasized that "Korea is China's neighbor.

The

Chinese cannot but be concerned about the solution of the
Korean question. . . .
fully."

37

It must and can be settled peace-

After Inchon, General Nieh Yen-jung, Acting Chief

of Staff of the Chinese Army, informed India's Ambassador
K. M. Panikkar, that the Chinese "did not intend to sit
back . . . and let the Americans come to our borders.

. . .

We know what we are in for, but at all costs the American
aggression must be stopped."

38

Chou publicly voiced these

^Rees, Korea, p. 106.
37

Chou En-lai, as cited in George and Smoke, Deterrence,

p. 200.
38Nieh Yen-jung, as cited in Bernstein, "The Policy of
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concerns on September 30.

"The Chinese people absolutely

will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they
tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded.”

39

The crossing of the 38th parallel became a causus belli
for China.

On October 2, Jewaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister

of India, addressed his parliament:
The Chinese government clearly indicated
that if the 38th parallel was crossed,
they would consider it a grave danger
to their own security and that they . . .
would not tolerate it. We did, as a
matter of fact, convey our views to the
governments of the United States of
America.
Throughout October these warnings .persisted, but without ef
fect; for United Nations and American troops crossed the
parallel.
On October 10, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs pro
claimed that since the parallel had been crossed, "the
Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a
serious situation created by the invasion of Korea .
and to the dangerous trend of extending the wa r . " ^

Yet,

despite the continued threats, on October 12, the Central
Risk," p. 18.
3®Chou En-lai, as cited in Allen S. Whiting, China
Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War
(New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 108.
40jewaharlal Nehru, as cited in Stoessinger, Nations
in Darkness, p. 51.
^Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement, Radio Peking,
October 11, 1950, as cited in Whiting, China Crosses the
Yalu, p. 115.
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Intelligence Agency (CIA) conveyed to the President that
’'there is no convincing indication of an actual Chinese
Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention
in Korea."4^

The report Was indicative of Washington's

response to China's warnings.

There is little evidence

that they were accorded the serious attention and analysis
they warranted.
5. America's Response to China
The flaw which continued to plague American policy
was the inability to imagine how their adversaries viewed
United Nations troop movements.

Dean Rusk, Assistant Sec^

retary of Far Eastern Affairs, inadvertently exposed this
shortcoming in a speech to a veteran's group.

"I have not

tried to look at them [American decisions] through Asian
eyes.

We are Americans, and it is our business to see

clearly through American eyes."4"^ Rather than analyzing
the Chinese threats, Truman and his advisers dismissed them
either as bluffs, propaganda, or merely wished them away.
In the words of the Consul General at Hong Kong the Chinese
were "saberrattling," for domestic and foreign consumption.44
42

Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency,
October 12, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:933.
A

7

Dean Rusk, "Fundamentals of Far Eastern Policy,"
Department of State Bulletin 23 (September 18, 1950) :466.
44

Consul General Wilkinson (Hong Kong) to Secretary
of State, September 25, 19 50, in FRUS, 1950, 7:768.
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Rees observes that the administration believed Peking
"really, thought the
threat

same as it did, and saw that a serious

to China did not exist."45

A number of interpreta

tions, often ambivalent and contradictory, were utilized
to minimize the threats.
During a television interview on September 7, for
example, Dean Acheson emphatically contended that since
United Nations action posed no threat whatever to the
Chinese, they would not intervene:
I think it would be sheer madness on
the part of the
Chinese Communists to do
that, and I see
no advantage to them in
doing it.
Now I give the people in Peiping credit
for being intelligent to see what is hap
pening to them. Why they should want to
further their own dismemberment and de
struction by getting at cross purposes
with all the free nations of the world
who are inherently their friends .
as against this imperialism coming down
from the Soviet Union I cannot see. And
since there is nothing in it for them, I
don't see why they should yield to what
is undoubtedly pressures from the Com
munist movement to get into this Korean
row.46
The Chinese leaders, Acheson believed, would base their
policy on national interests and not according to the party
line.

Ironically, much to Acheson's discomfort, this is

precisely what the Chinese did.
45Rees, Korea, p. 113.
4^Dean Acheson, "Foreign Policies Toward Asia - A Tele
vision Interview," 23 (September 18, 1950)-463-464.
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Despite Acheson's contention, Truman was reassured that
the Chinese would not intervene because of their close ties
with the Soviet Union.

According to General Lawton Collins,

intelligence reported that "although full-scale Communist
intervention in Korea should be regarded as a continuing
possibility, a consideration of all known facts led to the
conclusion that, barring a Soviet decision for global war,
such an action was not probable in 1950."^
The erroneous intelligence report was compounded by
Truman's insensitivity to China's apprehension over the ris
ing tensions in Korea.

There is no concrete evidence that

Truman ever gave the proper attention to the Chinese that
the situation demanded.

Not once did he propose that pos

sibly the Chinese were sincere and serious.
ings were treated as bluffs.

Rather the warn

The Truman Administration,

Collins asserts, "generally agreed that Chou's threats were
a bluff, primarily a last-ditch attempt to intimidate the
United States.
Thus the warnings were brushed aside as inconsequential.
MacArthur reassured Truman on this point at the Wake Island
Conference:

"We are no longer fearful of their interven

tion . . . if the Chinese tried .

. there would be the

47

Central Intelligence Report, as cited in Collins,
The Korean War, p. 17 5.
Ibid., p. 173. See also Truman, Memoirs, 2:362.
Truman recalled that "it appeared that Chou En-lai's mes
sage was a bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations by
threats of intervention in Korea."
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greatest slaughter."
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Truman exuded confidence in ultimate

victory, remaining steadfast in his conviction of the cor
rectness of American policy.

On October 17, upon returning

from the conference, Truman's speech exemplified this atti^
tude:
. . . I am confident that these forces will
soon restore peace to the whole of Korea.
. . . We talked about the plans for estab
lishing a 'united, independent, and demo
cratic' government in that country in
accordance with the resolution of the
General Assembly of the United Nations.
Our sole purpose in Korea is to estab
lish peace and independence. Our troops
will stay there only so long as they are
needed by the United Nations for that pur
pose. We seek no territory or special
privilege.
Let this be crystal clear to
all - we have no aggressive designs in
Korea or in any other place in the Far
East or elsewhere.
The United Nations forces are growing
in strength and are now far superior to
the forces which still oppose them. The
power of the Korean Communists to resist
effectively will soon be at an end.50
As Truman uttered these words, Chinese troops had already
entered Korea.
6. China Intervenes
To give an indication of American expectations at this
time, there was serious consideration given to redeploying
49

Substance of Statements made at Wake Island Confer
ence, October 15, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:953.
^^Harry S. Truman, "Partnership of World Peace," Depart
ment of State Bulletin 23 (October 30, 1950):683-684.
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two divisions for more pressing NATO assignments in Europe.

51

The American assuredness of success intensified until United
Nations troops contacted Chinese troops on October 26.

Now

that a flaw in American assumptions had been revealed, would
the policy of unification remain fixed or would Washington
halt MacArthur's drive to the Yalu?
On November 6, in a dispatch to the Embassy in the
United Kingdom, Acheson acknowledged the seriousness of the
new development.

Nevertheless, he refused to adapt American

objectives to this dramatic change:

"We do not believe how

ever that we should concede to Peiping any interest whatever
in the internal affairs of Korea or in the unification and
rehabilitation work to be carried out by the.UN."

52

Acheson

later affirmed that the situation demanded maximum firmness
and energetic action, not reappraisal.
Chinese suddenly drew b a c k . ^

53

On November 7, the

Yet, during the military pause

“^Truman, Memoirs, 2:373.
52
Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to Embassy
in the United Kingdom, November 6, 1950, in FRUS, 1950,
7:1053.
53

Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to the
United States Mission at the United Nations, November 13,
1.950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1143-1149.
*^See George and Smoke, Deterrence. chapter 7, for a dis
cussion of Chinese intentions and motivations in Korea. See
also Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu. p. 152. Whiting con
vincingly disputes the contention that China was coerced by
the Soviets; "China entered the war of her own free will."
See especially Memorandum by the JCS to the Secretary of De
fense George Marshall, November 9, 19.50, in FRUS. 1950.
7:1117. According to the JCS, commenting upon the first con
tact with the Chinese: "intervention in Korea must have been
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that followed the administration remained steadfast in its
conviction that neither the intentions nor the actions of
the United States threatened China's security.

They were

either unwilling or incapable of relinquishing their hope
for total victory, the fruits of which had been tasted
since Inchon.
The administration adopted, a strategy of reassuring
the Chinese of America's benign intent.55

On November 16,

the President issued this press release:
Speaking for the United States Govern
ment and people, I can give assurance
that we support and are acting within the
limits of the United
Nations
policy in
Korea and that we have never at any time
entertained any intention to carry hos
tilities into China. So far as the
United States is concerned, I wish to
state unequivocally that because of our
deep devotion to the cause of peace and
our long-standing friendship for the
people of China we will take every hon
orable step to prevent any extension of
the hostilities in the Far E a s t , 56
Earlier, Acheson attempted to quell China's fears, "If they
believe, as their
has

propaganda states, that the United

States

any ulterior designs in Manchuria, everythingpossible

motivated either by pressure of the USSR or by genuine Chinese
reasons or by a combination of both. There is no conclusive
evidence at hand upon which to draw sound inferences as to
what governs." Nevertheless, when the Chinese intervened on a
massive scale it was assumed that it was due to Soviet pressure.
S^The Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to the
United States Mission at the United Nations, November 7, 1950,
in FRUS, 1950. 7:1093.
56uarry S. Truman, "U.S. to Take Every Step to Prevent
Extending Hostilities in the Far East," Department of State
Bulletin 23 (November 27, 1950) :852-8-53.
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must be done to disabuse them of such an illusion because
it is not true.”

57

United States actions resounded oyer

these official pronouncements,

The reason for this is

simple; Washington did not perceive its actions as threaten
ing to.China, therefore, its policy remained intact.
The following statement by Dean Acheson illustrates
the inadequacy of America's response to China's "initial
intervention and demonstrates the wide gulf between Ameri
ca's and China's frame of reference:
It may be that they have worries about
their legitimate interests in the border
river and in the continuous territories
on either side. If that is so, every
thing in the world should be done to
make them understand that their proper
interests will be taken care of, and I
should suppose that there is no country
in the whole world which has a more out
standing [record] in developing the
theory of brotherly development of border
waters than the United States. On both
our borders, we have taken the lead in
doing that. We have worked out with
Mexico on the Rio Grande and on the
Colorado River . . . which the two coun
tries share equitably.
. . . So we really are the people who
have led the world in international de
velopment of border waters, and, there
fore, if the Chinese have any doubts
that our influence in the United Nations
would be used to bring about a construc
tive adjustment of Chinese-Korean in
terests in the Yalu River, they would be
very much mistaken if we would not do
that.58
57

Dean Acheson, "United States Foreign Policy," Depart
ment of State Bulletin 23 (November 27, 1950):855.
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It would require a considerable suspension of the iraagina^
tion to visualize Acheson being soothed by such advice as
the Chinese hordes edged closer to the Rio Grande, even if
their record on border disputes

was

unblemished.

The

example of the American reaction to Cuba's regime in Cuba
should suffice.
In light of Chinese actions, on November 9, the NSC
reevaluated MacArthur's mission during an emergency meeting.
Representing the JCS, Omar Bradley felt that since Korea
was strategically unimportant, continued United States in
volvement would only serve Russian interests, drain American
resources, and risk the general welfare of the United States.
Despite this analysis, the mission's purpose remained fixed.
According to Acheson, the NSC determined "that General
MacArthur's directive should not be changed and he should
do what he could in a military way" to unify Korea.^
On November 8, tjie CIA had reevaluated its previous
intelligence estimates.

According to this latest memo,

the CIA contended that the Chinese were capable of halting
the United Nations offensive and forcing a substantial re
treat.
59

Prior to the crossing of the parallel the Chinese

Dean Acheson, as cited in Bernstein, "The Policy of
Risk," p. 21. See also Memorandum of Conversation by
Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, November 21, 1950, In
FRUS. 1950. 7:1205. Marshall "expressed satisfaction that
Mr. Acheson had stated his belief that General MacArthur
should push forward with the planned offensive.”
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were unwilling to risk war; but, either due to Soviet pres
sures or to national interests they were now willing to
n
accept the risk.
Given the risk of general war, or at
least entanglement in an insignificant theater, what pos
sible explanation can there be for America's persistence
in pursuing unification?

In Washington's heart and mind

Korea was already united, a beaming symbol of American suc
cess against communist aggression and tyranny*

The dream

was too sweet, whereas reality was too bitter to be faced.
In spite of the risk, Truman sanctioned the renewed drive
for unification.
could deliver it.

Victory was essential, and MacArthur
"But under this obvious truth," Acheson

later reflected, "I felt uneasy respect for the MacArthur
mystique.

Strange as these manuverings [military opera

tions] appeared, they could be another 5,000-to-l shot by
the sorcerer of I n c h o n . E v e n the stoic Secretary of
State, who prided his ability for realistic appraisal,
was seduced by the lure of victory.

"As I look back,", he

later wrote, "the critical period stands as the three weeks
from October 26 to November 17.

Then all the dangers

of . . . intervention by the Chinese were manifest."

f\ 7

Acheson, too, had been blinded by the flame which had burnt
brightly in the "lamp of hope" since July 27, 1950.
6QMemorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, Novem
ber 8, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1101.
^Acheson, Creation, p. 467.
62Ibid., p. 468.
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On November 26, Collins, the Army'-s Chief of Staff,
wired to MacArthur that there was no change in his mission,
which, if successful, should include preparations for elections and unification.

fi X

That same day Acheson wired to

London:
It seems to me of the greatest importance
that General MacArthur's operation be given
every support by the UN. . . . The results
of his operation will make much more clear
many matters now obscure, the strength and
effectiveness of the Chi forces, the inten
tion and capacity of the Commie authorities
to support and reinforce them, etc.
Two days later the Chinese enlightened Acheson on these
obscure matters.
On November 26, 1950, the massive Chinese intervention
shattered the dreams, illusions, and hopes of the Truman Ad^
ministration.

American policy, since it rested upon

MacArthur's ability to repeat another Inchon, collapsed
like a house of cards.

A military miracle had become a

nightmare.
7. The American Response
Even the massive intervention prompted no reappraisal
by the administration of its fundamental perceptions.

Rather

^ T h e Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, U. S. Army
(Washington) to the Commander in Chief Douglas MacArthur,
UN Command, November 24, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1223-1224.
^ T h e Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington) to
Embassy in the United Kingdom, November 24, 1950, in FRUS,
1950, 7:1228.
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than a response toAmerican actions,

the Truman Administra

tion perceived the intervention as a hostile, unwarranted
act of aggression.

During a meeting on November 28, the

NSC agreed that the Chinese actions were directed primarily
by the Soviet U n i o n . " T h e present aggression," the
President later said, "is thus revealed as a long calculated
move to defy the United Nations . . . these Chinese have
been misled or forced into their reckless attack .. . . to
further the designs of the Soviet Union."

Acheson seconded

Truman1s conviction:
The Soviet Union was behind everyone of
the Chinese and North Korean moves and
that we had to think of all that happened
in Korea as world matters. We should
never lose sight of the fact that we are
facing the Soviet Union all around the
world.67
The Chinese leaders were "unfaithful to the characteristics,
traditions and interests of the Chinese people," since the
communists, Austin asserted, "had put their necks into the
Soviet collar."^8

The intervention further entrenched the

^Memorandum
Conversation by Ambassador at Large
Philip Jessup, November 28, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1242-1249.
66Harry S. Truman, "President*s Message to Congress," De
partment of State Bulletin 23 (December 11, 1950):927.
See
also United States Delegation Minutes of the First Meeting of
President Truman and Prime Minister Clement Atlee, December 4,
1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:1366-1367. Acheson said: "The Communist
Chinese were not looking at the matter as Chinese but as Com
munists who are subservient to Moscow. All they do is based
on the Moscow pattern, they are better pupils even than the
East European satellites."
67Truman, Memoirs, 2:387.
68Warren Austin, "U.N. Collective Action Urged Against
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American fear of the communists1 willingness to use force.
"If there was any doubt," Rusk declared, "that the Com
munist imperialists were prepared to use force to secure
their ends, there is no reason for doubt anymore."^9

The

intervention renewed the administration’s fears that Russia
had embarked upon a plan of world domination.

Warren

Austin’s fear that the intervention was a "part of the
world-wide pattern of centrally directed imperialism,"

70

echoed Truman’s concern that "this new act of aggression
in Korea is only a part of a world-wide pattern of danger
71
to all the free nations of the world."
After the Chinese forced a humiliating retreat upon
MacArthur, the restraint, which had characterized the ad
ministration's behavior prior to Inchon, regained top
priority.

The continued viability of the United Nations,

the collective security system, the prestige of the United
States, and the risk of general war once again were the.
primary concerns of Washington.

During the despondent days

of December, with a catastrophic defeat imminent, the
Communist Regime in China," Department of State Bulletin 24
(January 29, 1951):166.
6^Dean Rusk, "Our Contribution to Peace," Department
of State Bulletin 2.4 (January 8, 1951): 65.
70Warren Austin, "U.N. Collective Action Urged Against
Communist Regime in China," Department of State Bulletin 24
(January 29, 1951):169.
7lHarry S. Truman, "Chinese Communist - Attack on Korea
Demands Strengthening of Free World's Defenses," Department
of State Bulletin 23 (December 11, 1950):926.
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administration refused to negotiate under duress, or to
withdraw ignominiously. "If we gave concessions, they would
only become more aggressive. . . . We should make it a policy
not to recognize the enemy's gains.1'7 2

"Of course if we got

thrown out of Korea there would be no negotiations, but we
would have made pur point,"

73

since, as Acheson argued,

there "was a great difference between being forced out and
getting out."7^

The administration religiously followed

the respected authority on Soviet Affairs, George Kennan,
that the "worst time to negotiate with the Communists was
from a position of defeat."75
Once the United Nations troops reestablished defensive
positions against the attack, the situation in Korea sta
bilized.

Washington redirected its focus on more urgent

concerns.

Acheson, among others, feared the entanglement

in Korea would weaken its position in the world:
The Kremlin probably saw advantages to it
in the U.S.-Chinese war flowing from di
version, attrition, and containment of
U.S. forces in an indecisive theater; the
creation of a conflict between the United
States and her European allies and obstruc
tion of NATO plans; the disruption of UN
unity against the original aggression in

7^Truman, Memoirs, 2:398.
73Ibid., 2:407.
n A

Acheson, Creation, p. 482.
75Ibid., p. 476.
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Korea; thus aiding communist objectives
in South East Asia.76
The Truman Administration desperately sought to avoid gen
eral warfare, but also shared Acheson's dread of "being
sucked into a bottomless pit."

77

Truman vowed that the Korean crisis would not divert
America from its vital interests:

"I had no intention of

allowing our attention to be diverted from the unchanging
aims and designs of the Soviet policy . . . in our age,
78
Europe . . . is still the key to world peace."
On Janu
ary 8 , 1951, in the State of the Union message, Truman
reaffirmed American priorities.

"The heart of our common

effort is the North Atlantic community," he stated.

"The

defense of Europe is the basis for the defense of the
whole free-world - ourselves included."

79

The critical

significance of Europe to America's security mitigated the
pressures pushing towards general war and entanglement in a
peripheral area of the world.
An overriding factor which prompted the original
United States intervention was a commitment to a viable
76Ibid., p. 474.
77
Dean Acheson, as cited in David S. McLellan, Dean
Acheson: The State Department Years (New York: Dodd, Mead
and Co. * 1976), p. 296.
~
~
78

79

Truman, Memoirs, 2:380.

Harry S. Truman, "The State of the Union Address,"
Department of State Bulletin 24 (January 22, 1951):125.
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collective security system,

therefore the United States

took care not to weaken or destroy this system during the
prosecution of the war,

"If we go it alone in Asia,"

Truman stated, "we may destroy the unity of free na
tions . . . the whole idea of going it alone is the opposite of everything we stood for - since World War II." 80
United Nations actions which might spark escalation were
to be avoided at all costs.

According to Acheson, a policy

which threatened America's allies was not feasible:
We cannot expect that our collectivesecurity system will long survive if we
take steps which unnecessarily and dan
gerously expose the people who are in
the system with us. . . . I n relation
to the total world threat, our safety
requires that we strengthen, not weaken,
the bond of our collective security
system.81
For these reasons MacArthur's demands to expand the war were
rejected and explain the subsequent dismissal from his com
mand.

During the MacArthur Hearings, Marshall .testified that:
General MacArthur . . . would have us
on our own initiative carry the conflict
beyond Korea against the mainland of Com
munist China, ; . . He would have us
accept the risk of involvement * . . in
an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He
would have us do this even at the expense
of losing our allies and wrecking the
coalition of free peoples throughout the
80

Harry S. Truman, "Why We Need Allies," Department of
State Bulletin 24 (May 14, 1951) :765.
81

Dean Acheson, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 3:1719.
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world. He would have us do this even
though the effort of such an action
might expose Western Europe to attack
by the millions of Soviet troops poised
in middle and eastern E u r o p e .
Consequently the United States drew back after the Chinese
intervention, resuming a policy of restraint and limiting
its ambitions to the restoration of the status quo ante
bellum.

On April 5, ,1951, the JCS conveyed to Acheson that

"For the first time we conceded that 'the Korean problem
cannot be resolved in a manner satisfactorily to the United
States by military action alone."'

83

America returned to

its original objectives of maintaining a viable collective
security system, of avoiding a general war, and of strength
ening Europe, the key area to world peace.

A policy of re

straint was pursued in order to avoid involvement, in the
now famous words of Bradley, "in the wrong war, at the
wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

84

8 . The Impact of Korea
As previously mentioned, the intervention by the Chinese
strengthened the American belief that the communists were
engaging in a plan of world conquest by force.
82

The Korean

George Marshall, as cited in MacArthur Hearings,

!: 441..

83
JCS Memorandum to the Secretary of State, April 5,
1951, as cited in Collins, The Korean War, p. 304.
84

Omar Bradley, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:732.
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War, especially China’s actions, globalized the Cold War.
American ieaders now perceived that the greatest threat
to the free world, to Europe, might come from the East.
John Foster Dulles, the next Secretary of State, voiced
this rising concern in a radio address on March 1, 1951:
. . . Many seem to think that our safety
is linked only to the West, meaning
Europe, and that the East can be ignored.
But just as the United States would be in
peril if Europe was overrun, so also we
and Europe would be in peril if the East
were overrun. We should never forget
that Stalin, long ago, laid it down that
as basic Communist strategy that 'the
road to victory over the West' lies
through the E a s t . 85
This perspective was shared by high officials in Truman’s
Administration.
our

"The fact that our Far Eastern policy and

European policy have been separately debated,"

maintained, "should

not lead us to the fatal error

Acheson
ofre-

garding these policies as being divorced from one another."

86

MacArthur expressed these sentiments held by the administra
tion when he testified, "I believe the first line of defense
now, for Europe, is right where we are fighting over there
in Korea.

It is a global effort, and if you breach that, it

will roll around to Europe as sure as the sun rolls around."
85

87

John Foster Dulles, "Laying Foundations for a Pacific
Peace," Department of State Bulletin 24 (March 17, 1951):403.
o

Dean Acheson, "Our Far Eastern Policy," Department of
State Bulletin 24 (April 30, 1951):683.
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Douglas MacArthur, as cited in MacArthur Hearings,
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America now gave more attention to Asia and to Soviet
designs in the area.

Asia, Washington perceived, was en

gaged in a life-death struggle with Chinese and Soviet
communism.

Acheson feared the rise of communism in the

area since "it is really the spearhead of Russian imperi
alism which would . . . take from these people . . . their
88
own national independence." .

Omar Bradley considered Asia

crucial to America's security and declared:
From a global viewpoint - and with the
security of our nation of prime importance our military mission is to support a policy
of preventing communism from gaining the
manpower, the resources, the raw materials,
and the industrial capacity essential to
world domination.
If Soviet Russia ever
controls the entire Eurasia land mas$, then
the Soviet-satellite imperialism may have
its broad base upon which to build the
military power to rule t h e w o r l d . 89
Soon it was believed that communism had to be actively
resisted throughout the world.

"I believe the problem is

a global one," MacArthur admonished.
defend every place from communism.

"I believe we should
I believe we can."

90

A respected Cold War scholar notes that "the question of
whether communism motivated Moscow’s policy was left

00
Dean Acheson, "Crisis in Asia - An Examination of
U. S. Policy," Department of State Bulletin 22 (January 23,
1950):114.
89
90

Omar Bradley, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:731.

Douglas MacArthur, as cited in MacArthur Hearings,
1:81 and 120.
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unclear,”

91

The original aggression and then the traumatic inter
vention by China, reinforced the administration’s suspicions
that all communist activities were sinister instruments of
Soviet, and now Chinese, expansion.

John Gaddis observes:

By getting into an unnecessary fight
with the Chinese Communists, the Truman
Administration encouraged the view that
international communism was a monolith
that had to be resisted wherever it
appeared. . ... . [I]t was easy for suc
ceeding administrations to jump to the
conclusion that there was no distinction
between the peripheral and vital inter
ests, that threats to order anywhere
endangered American security elsewhere.
Acheson vehemently argued that America could no longer afford
to distinguish between big and little aggressions and there
fore "we must be vigorous everywhere," especially when
American interests were threatened.

93

An area now perceived to be vital and threatened was
Indochina.

With Korea, Truman asserted, "We are seeing a

pattern in Korea as a challenge to the free world . . .
the Communists."

94

by

Acheson recalled years later that John

Ohley, a State Department colleague, had warned that America
ought to look "at where it was headed in Indochina." Ohley
91

Gaddis, "Origins of Containment," p. 515.:

92Ibid., p. 518.
93
Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador at Large
Philip Jessup, December 5, 1950, in'FRUS, 1950, 7:1383.
94.
Truman, Memoirs, 2:380.
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feared that the United States would supplant the French in
Indochina and that direct intervention would follow.

He

concluded that "these situations have a way of snowballing,"
but his words went unheeded.

Acheson candidly admitted,

"I decided, however, that having put our hand to the plow,
we would not look back.”95

America would not look back for

over twenty years.
In his memoirs, Anthony Eden, a former British Prime
Minister, expressed his admiration for the decisive, yet
restrained American policy in Korea.

He especially praised

the United States avoidance of entanglement on the Asian
continent.
land,

"They had no taste for war on the Chinese main

They understood the danger of that tar baby.

But

future tar babies would be difficult to avoid in Asia, given
American attitudes and perceptions following Korea.
95
96
p. 14.

John Ohley, as cited in Acheson, Creation, p. 674.
Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960),

CHAPTER III
PROBLEMS IN PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY:

THE

TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATIONS
IN VIETNAM, 1945-1960
The course upon which we are today
moving is one, as I see it, so little
promising and so fraught with danger,
. . . In Indo-China we are getting our
selves into the position of guarantee
ing the French in an undertaking which
neither they nor we, nor both of us
together can win.i
George Kennan
Most observers of international politics after World
War II stressed the further decline of European civilization
with the ascendance of Russia and the United States as the
dominant powers of the world.

Little attention, however,

was given to the consequences of the war in Asia.

Franklin

Roosevelt and Harry Truman initially desired to foster a
new world order conducive to American interests.

Stalin

wanted to consolidate the Soviet Union's security needs in
Eastern Europe, and Charles DeGaulle aspired to restore to
France its "grandeur."

But these visions and ambitions of

^Counselor George Kennan to the Secretary of State,
August 21, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:623-624.
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the great actors were of minor concern to the emerging
leaders of Asia.

Instead, Asian peoples hoped to seize

upon the opportunities which ensued following the postwar
period.

The dream of Asia was to rid their homelands Of

foreign domination.
Throughout Asia, the outbreak of World War II with the
early victories of the Japanese against the Western powers
inaugurated a period of intense nationalism on the Continent.
Psychologically, these momentary triumphs symbolized the
liberation of Asia.

John F. Cady, a Southeast Asian scholar,

contends that the dramatic victories of the Japanese laid
bare "the myth of Western invincibility . . . and Asia for
?
the Asiatics became the universally accepted goal."
The
deep-seated resentment toward colonial rule combined with
this yearning for national independence created a movement
with a profound emotional and intellectual potency.

Na

tionalism swept across Asia acquiring a fervor which lingers
to this day.
1. The American Quandry of Colonialism
Versus Communism
After World War II, the process of rapid decolonization
left a number of weak emerging states' ]groping~f o r ’their ’
proper place in Southeast Asia.
2

The absence of indigenous

John F. Cady, The History of Post-War Southeast Asia
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), p. 1.
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strength or unity attracted outside powers to fill the vacuum.
These countries sought to reassert Western dominance in the
area, a goal antagonistic to the aspirations of Southeast
Asia.

A scholar observed that "decolonization . , . opened

a Pandora's box of national rivalries and conflicting national interests m

Southeast Asia."

3

Hence Southeast Asia

became vulnerable to historical forces of enormous complexity
and endurance.

The hornet's nest created by nationalism,

decolonization, and postwar readjustment demanded a patient
response cognizant of the nuances and power of these phe-^
nomena.

During the transitional era of nation building,

the region's maze of problems refused to yield t o .easy or
pat solutions.
As the promise of national independence enthralled
Asian nationalists, American policy makers deciphered the
import Of the forces unleashed by the war from a distinct
and unique perspective.

While Asia embarked upon a period

of nation building, the United States emerged as a nation
of awesome and unprecedented strength.

Although hopeful

of a postwar world of peace and order, by late 1946 or
early 1947 America's leaders surmised that the country's
proper role in world affairs would be as leader of the free
-.world against Soviet expansion.^

Consequently, despite an

3

Russell H. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia: The
Roots of Commitment (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 19731 ,
p. 244.
4
Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the
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appreciation of the intensity and legitimacy of Asian na
tionalism, American decision makers shared a conviction
that Soviet communism and imperialism constituted the most
potent and dangerous force of the postwar era.
Thus the seeds were sown that confronted Washington
with a genuine problem which plagueid its Asian policy for
years:

How could the U.S. reconcile its predominant fear

of Soviet expansion in Asia while at the same time recog
nizing the authentic goals of the Asian peoples?

In 1955,

a remark by an official of Eisenhower's Administration ex
posed the dilemma which haunted United States policy from
Truman until Nixon:
Although in American eyes no problem
stands out more predominantly in Asia,
especially in Southeast Asia, than the
threat of Communist aggression and sub
version, we realize that to most of the
leaders and peoples of this vast region
the threat of communism is no more than
a secondary concern and that their in
terests and emotions are centered on such
questions as 'colonialism,' 'nationalism,'
and 'neutralism.'^
As the tensions of the Cold War increased, the gap between
these priorities widened.
Though American policy from 1945 to 1947 favored the
Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1977). See also Robert Donovan, Conflict and
Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948 (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1977), and Gaddis, Origins of the Cold
War.
^Walter S. Robertson, "The United States Looks at South
and Southeast Asia," Department of State Bulletin 33
(August 22, 1955):295.
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restoration of French rule to Indochina, the Truman Adminis
tration considered Vietnam a peripheral area of the world.
Therefore even though its consequences proved significant,
subsequent policy would not be formulated as if vital in
terests were at stake.

George C. Herring, a Cold War his

torian, contends that since America

found itself "caught

between the demands of European colonialism and nationalism,
the Truman administration adopted what the State Department
described as a ‘hands-off p o l i c y w h i c h remained fixed
f\
until at least 1947.
Europeanists within the Department
were the catalysts behind this policy.

H. Freeman Mathews,

the Director of the State Department's Office of European
Affairs, and James C. Dunn, the Assistant Secretary of State,
profoundly influenced Southeast Asian policy.

Both promul

gated pro-French sentiments and even prior to 1946 anticipated
the apprehension of Soviet designs on Europe which later
characterized American policy.

For them anti-colonialism

remained a mere abstraction, whereas France's security and
might became linked to America's vital interests.

Hence the

United States casually recognized the return of French
sovereignty to Indochina, quite oblivious to what this
acquiescence would portend.

^George C. Herring, "The Truman Administration and the
Restoration of French Sovereignty in Indochina," Diplomatic
History 1 (Summer 1977):113.
7Ibid., pp. 97-,117.
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In January 1947 , Abbot Low Moffat of the Division of
Southeast Asian Affairs protested that the hands-off policy
was narrowly based upon European considerations and if con?
tinued would cost Washington its influential role in Southeast Asia.

8

As Cold War tensions increased, Moffat's con

cern went unheeded and his advice formally rejected.

The

administration responded with the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan as Soviet-American ill will hardened over
crises in Greece, Turkey, and throughout Europe.

The key

stone of America's containment policy was Western Europe.
Therefore as America's interests now coincided with the
French, its policy in Southeast Asia changed.

On May 13,

1947, Secretary of State George Marshall cabled to the
American Embassy in France that "we cannot conceive setbacks
to [the] long-range interests [of] France which would not
also be setbacks to our own."

9

Nevertheless, Marshall

acknowledged that if France neglected to satisfy Indochina's
nationalist aspirations then Western democracy would succumb
to Soviet communism in Asia.

But this awareness never com

pelled the Truman Administration to abandon France's ambi
tions in favor of Asian nationalism.

The dreaded Soviet

threat to Europe formed the highest priority of the adminis
tration throughout its tenure.

France, not Indochina, lured

8

Consul General Josselyn (Singapore) to the Secretary
State, January 7, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, 6:54-55.
9

Secretary of State George Marshall (Washington) to
the Embassy in France, May 13, 1947, in FRUS, 1946, 6:95,
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America's intention and energies to its cause.

America’s

ideals, interests, and survival were at stake, and France
was a close, ally.10
With the leaders of America preoccupied by the Cold War,
it became increasingly difficult for the United States to
appraise the situation in Asia objectively.

Accordingly,

Asia and its complexities were viewed by Washington through
the prism of the Cold War.

Hence the American dilemma of

maintaining the delicate balance between the forces of anti
colonialism, nationalism, and communism became acute.
During a later Congressional hearing in 1972, Moffat
testified that toward the end of 1946 the State Department
directed its energies chiefly to the rise of a Soviet
controlled monolithic communist bloc.

Previously "we could,

until the fear of Communism affected objectivity, analyze
problems without the handicap of self-interest, prejudice,
pride or domestic problems." 11

Subsequently, however, "as

Department concern about the Communist domination of the
Vietnamese government became more apparent and more uncriti
cal, we began . . .

to allow our fears of such domination to

overrule our better judgment."

12

Still from 1946 to 1948

1(^See Gaddis, Origins of the Cold War.
■^Abbot Low Moffat, as cited in U.S., Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Causes. Origins, and Lessons
of the Vietnam War. Hearings, 92d Cong., 2d, sess., May 711, 1972, p. 169.
(Hereafter cited as Causes and Origins.)
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uncertainty and doubt characterized American policy.

The

United States groped for a coherent and guiding philosophy
regarding its Southeast Asia policy.

The tendency to stress

the containment Of communism in Asia received added impetus
from the communist successes in China.
Even prior to the culmination of the Chinese Revolution,
America’s fear of communism in Asia; manifested itself.

On

October 13, 1948,. the Acting Secretary of State dispatched
a cable which stated that the Soviet’s aim in Southeast Asia
was "to substitute the influence of the USSR for that of the
western powers in such manner and degree as to ensure Soviet
control being as surely installed and predominant as in the
satellite countries behind the Iron Curtain."

13

Under the

guise of nationalism the Soviet Union, according to the
State Department, exploited Asian aspirations for their own
ends.

The Russian objectives were implemented "almost ex

clusively [by] Chinese Communist guidance of Southeast Asian
movements."1^

This dispatch was indicative, claims one

scholar, of the American disquiet "that the pattern of post
war expansion in Eastern Europe was now to be repeated in
Asia, with Peking, as rigidly controlled as European satel
lites, serving as Moscow's junior partner and Asian bases.
■^Director for European Affairs John D. Hickerson (Wash
ington) to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, "Pattern
of Soviet Policy in Far East and Southeast Asia," October 13,
1948, in FRUS, 1948, 1:643.
14Ibid.
■^^Evelyn Colbert, Southeast Asia in International Politics
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In this context, the question whether Ho Chi Minh was a com
munist acquired a sense of urgency within the State Depart
ment .
Ho Chi Minh, a cross-fertilization between European
communism and Asian nationalism was, according to John
Stoessinger, "probably one of the most complex figures of
modern times."

16

Ho did not consider communism and nation

alism as antagonistic ideologies.
were mutually supportive.

Rather, Ho thought they

However, American policy makers

were unable to make this distinction.
From 1945 to 1946 the Truman Administration's attitude
towards Ho can best be described as an ambivalent one,
marred by inattention and ignorance.

By late 1946, as un

easiness about Soviet expansion magnified, the inclination
to view Ho as a tool of the Kremlin gained respectability.

17

As Moffat later testified, American leaders allowed the Cold
War to "let the nationalistic feelings of the country recede
in importance and we ignored the father figure that Ho Chi
18
Minh was becoming for most Vietnamese."
While serving as Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson
1941-1956 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 127.
"^Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness, p. 66. •
17
Colbert, Southeast Asia, pp. 125-130. See also Cady,
Southeast Asia, pp. 18-26.
18

p. 169.

Abbot Low Moffat, as cited in Causes and Conflicts,
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in late 1946 wired the following cable to the American Consul
in Saigon:

"Keep in mind Ho';s clear record as [an] agent

[of] international communism . . . [since the] least desir
able eventuality would be [the] establishment [of a]
Communist-dominated Moscow-oriented state [in] Indochina."

19

Later, on February 3, 1947, a State cable to France warned
of Ho's direct communist connections and registered its op
position to "seeing colonial empire administration supplanted
by [a] philosophy and political organizations emanating and
controlled by [the] Kremlin."20
Still this view had not yet become the basis of American
policy in Southeast Asia.

The American Consuls to Hanoi and

Saigon, James L. O'Sullivan and Charles Reed II, cautioned
the State Department not to foreclose debate on the nature
of Ho's allegiances.

Their wires to Washington stated that

though a communist, existing evidence indicated that Ho was
first and foremost an ardent nationalist.

Both expressed

concern that if the United States continued its support of
the French, Ho would have little choice but to align himself
more firmly with the communist camp.

21

19

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Abbot Low
Moffat, December 5, 1946, as cited in U.S., Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, A Staff Study Based on the
Pentagon Papers. 92d Cong., 2d seSs., April 3, 1972, pp.
18-19.
(Hereafter cited as Staff Study.)
20

Secretary of State George Marshall (Washington) to
American Embassy in Paris, February 3, 1947, Staff Study,
p. 20.
21
Consul Reed (Saigon) to Secretary of State, June 14,
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Secretary Marshall questioned the validity of the grow
ing acceptance among the French and State Department that Ho
was merely the pawn of the Soviet Union.

Marshall felt that

’’the impression here [is that] Ho [is] publicly attempting
to walk [a] chalked line between nationalism and Communism.”

22

The same dilemma confronted the Americans; it would prove
difficult indeed to walk its own chalked line in Southeast
Asia.
The Chinese Revolution with the establishment of a com
munist base of operations in Asia accentuated the tendency to
banish Ho to the communist bloc.

For Washington, Mao Tse-

tung1s victory against the Chinese Nationalists was feared
as a harbinger of a trend that would sweep across Asia.
The administration dreaded a repetition of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe in Asia.

23

By 1949 Acheson pro

claimed that:
the question [ofj whether Ho [was] as much
[a] nationalist as [a] Commie . . . [was]
irrelevant. All Stalinists in colonial
areas are nationalists . . . with [the]
achievement [of] national aims their ob
jective becomes subordinate to Commie
purposes . . . o n [the] basis [of] . . .
Eastern Europe it must be assumed JTthat]
such would be [the] goal [of] H o . ? 4
1947, in FRUS, 1947, 6:103-105, See also Reed’s dispatches of
July 19, and 24, pp. 119-120, 123-126. See Vice.Consul O ’Sul
livan to Secretary of State, July 19, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, 6:120.
^Secretary of State George Marshall (Washington) to Con
sulate General at Saigon, July 17, 1947, in FRUS, 1947, 6:116.
23colbert, Southeast Asia, p. 126.
24secretary of State Dean Acheson (Washington)

to American
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In October 1949, a State memorandum concluded that any ’'Com
munist activity, particularly Chinese and Vietnamese expan
sion into Southeast Asia, is an expression of Soviet imperi
alism.”25
By late 1949, America’s specific goal of containing the
Soviet Union began to be blurred by an anxiety of communist
activity in general.

The United States was either unwilling

or unable to distinguish any fundamental differences between
Soviet and Asiatic communism.

America’s Ambassador to France,

the late David Bruce, cabled to Acheson that "I assume [that]
no responsible American official believes that we can afford
to take a chance that Asiatic Communism will in a reasonable
future become a national Communism more friendly to [the] US
than to the USSR.”

26

A risk of such magnitude was unthink

able in a world perceived to be so threatening.

One could

not gamble when world peace was at stake.
2. A Turning Point
Whatever doubts the Truman Administration entertained
about Ho's loyalties were strengthened by Moscow's and
Peking’s recognition of his regime on January 22, 1950.
Consul in Hanoi, May 20, 1949, in Staff Study, pp. 21-22.
25
Assistant Secretary of State Far Eastern Affairs W.
Walton Butterworth (Washington),October 20, 1949, in FRUS,
1949, 7:93.
“
Ambassador to France David K. Bruce (Paris) to Sec
retary of State, December 11, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, 7:106.
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"The Soviet acknowledgement of this movement," Acheson
asserted, "should remove any illusions as to the 'nation
alist1 nature of Ho Chi Minh1s aims and reveals Ho in his
true colors as the mortal enemy of national independence
in Indochina."

27

The administration failed to comprehend

that an authentic nationalist could espouse communist doc
trine.
Philip C. Jessup, Truman's Ambassador at Large, best
exemplified the administration's attitude.

By 1949, he

states, "the evidence showed that Ho was the most dangerous
and powerful agent of Soviet Communism in Far East Asia."

28

Jessup added that "unless there were proofs to the con
trary we must assume Ho was and would remain a Moscow
29
stooge."
When testifying to Congress on March 29, 1950,
Jessup rebutted Senator Green's accusation that America
was blindly embarking on a universal commitment to a status
quo susceptible to revolutionary ferment:

"It is now per

fectly clear that Ho Chi Minh is a Moscow-trained Communist
27

Dean Acheson, as cited in Senator Mike Gravel, ed. ,
The Senate Gravel Edition: The Defense Department History of
the United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. 4 vols. (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971), 1:41.
(Hereafter cited as the Pentagon
Papers.) The other edition, the government version of the
so-called "Pentagon Papers" will be cited as: U.S., Department
of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations. 1945-1967. 12
vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971).
(Here
after cited as U.S.-Vietnam Relations.)
^Philip C. Jessup, The Birth of Nations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 168.
29Ibid., p. 167.
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and the leading figure in the Communist drive in Southeast
Asia."

30

This perception apparently justified America's

policy of supporting the French over Ho Chi Minh.
As early as July 15, 1948, Marshall informed the French
that America "would materially assist in strengthening [the]
hands of [the] nationalists as opposed to [the] Communists
in Indochina."

31

By mid-1949, Dean Acheson endorsed a dip

lomatic note stating that the paramount issue in Indochina
was whether it would be spared the ordeal of communist
domination.

32

However, as indicated by Acheson's testimony,

the United States hoped to wash its hands in respect to
French colonialism:
If we put ourselves sympathetically on
the side of nationalism, which is the domi
nant spiritual force in that area, we put
ourselves on the side of the thing which
more than anything else can oppose com
munism. . . . We will get nowhere, I think,
by supporting the French as a colonial
power against Indochina.33
Subsequent events would ease America’s qualms concerning its
association with the French.
30

Philip C. Jessup, as cited in U.S., Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Reviews of the World Situa
tion: 1949-50. Executive Session Hearings, 81st Cong., 1st
and 2d sess., 1950, p. 268.
(Hereafter cited as World
Situation.)
31

Secretary of State George Marshall (Washington) to
Embassy in France, July 14, 1948, in FRUS, 1948, 6:33.
32

Director for Far Eastern Affairs W. Walton Butterwroth (Washington) to Embassy in France, in U.S.-Vietnam
Relations, Book 8 , V.B.3., I, pp. 208-209.
33

Jessup, Nations, p. 171.
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Shortly after the Chinese Revolution, Acheson revealed
the administration's Asian policy to Jessup:

"You will

please take as your assumption," he said, "that it is a
fundamental decision of American policy that the United
States does not intend to permit further extension of Com
munist domination of the continent or in the Southeast
Asian area."

34

Therefore, prior to the Korean War, Wash

ington hoped to curb Soviet expansion in Asia.

On December

23, 1949, a National Security Council study, NSC 48, con
cluded that communist domination of China facilitated Soviet
aims around the globe, especially in Asia.

35

A later NSC

study contended:
It is important to United States secur
ity needs that all practical measures be
taken to prevent further communist expan
sion in Southeast Asia.
Indochina is a
key area of Southeast Asia and is under
immediate threat.36
America's concerns were limited to policy statements.

Soon

events compelled the administration to act.

34

Instructions of Secretary of State Dean Acheson to
Philip C. Jessup, U.S. , Congress, Senate, in Nomination of
Philip C. Jessup. Sub-committee Hearings* 82d Cong., 1st
sess., September 27 - October 15, 1951, p. 603.
*^NSC 48/1, "Report by the National Security Council
on the Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,"
December 23, 1949, in U.S.^Vietnam Relations, Book 8, V.B.2.,
I, pp. 226-244.
“
7r

NSC 64, "Report by the National Security Council on
the Position of the United States with Respect to Indo
china," February 27, 1950, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 8,
V.B.2., II, p. 285.
~
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The United States quickly recognized and praised the
French ratification of the Elysee Agreement on February 2,
1950.

37

The accord promised the future independence of

Indochina with the French Union.

Consequently, the United

States commenced its program of direct aid to French Indo
china, thus initiating the formal bi-polarization of Viet
nam.

By May 1, 1950, Truman authorized ten million dollars

of aid to Indochina.

Three weeks later Acheson justified

the extension of economic and military aid since "neither
national independence nor democratic evolution can exist
in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism."

38

During the

first week of June, Acheson explicitly linked France's
effort in Indochina to the free world's conflict against
communism by announcing Washington’s resolve to support the
French "in their struggle to preserve the freedom and inte
grity of Indochina from the Communist forces of Ho Chi
Minh."39
Though America

increased its effort to contain Soviet

expansion in Asia, the commitment was restricted largely to
philosophic outlook and rhetoric.

This is evident by

37Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 1:40-41.
38 Dean Acheson, "Economic and Military Aid Urged for
Indochina," Department of State Bulletin 22 (May 22, 1950):
821.
39

Dean Acheson, as cited in U.S., Congress, Senate, Com
mittee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Defense Assistance Pro
gram, 1950-1951, p. 8 . (Hereafter cited as Mutual Defense.)
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Acheson*s refusal to apply the Truman Doctrine universally
to China,4^ by the hope that a wedge between the Soviets
and Chinese could be implanted,41 and finally by the ex
clusion of Korea from America's vital interests in Acheson's
infamous "defense perimeter" address of January 12, 1950.
Acheson clarified America's attitude on April 11, 1950:
It is not defeatism r on the contrary it
is the beginning of victory - to arrive at
a realistic recognition of the limitation's
of one's own strength. We will bring our
selves nothing but confusion by thinking
that we are so strong that there is some
way by which our government can determine
what is to go on in every country every
where. 42
Nevertheless, the United States had moved gradually away from
the distinction between nationalism and communism in Southeast
Asia.

In an era of insecurity the fine line between peripheral

and vital interests blurred as America's security needs proved
elusive of precise definition.
Three weeks prior to war in Korea Acheson testified to
Congress that "The interests of the United States are global
in character.

A threat to the peace of the world anywhere is

a threat to our own security."43

The outbreak of war bestowed

40isjorman A. Graebner, "Dean G. Acheson," in An Uncertain
Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth
Century, ed. Norman A. Graebner (New York; McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1961), p. 281.
41

World Situation, p. 273,

42pean Acheson, as cited in McLellan, "Operational
Code," p. 67.

43pean Acheson, as cited in Mutual Defense, p. 8 .
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upon this judgment a compelling logic.

The debate within

the Truman Administration between a foreign policy reflect
ing realistic restraint or global universalism ceased.
The reverberations emitted by the Korean conflict
further entrenched the globalism of America's foreign policy.
One scholar, asserts that "in many ways Korea did for the
Cold War what Pearl Harbor had done for World War 11."^
Former benefits, doubts, and suspicions held about Soviet
intentions were transformed to convictions tested by the
fires of war.

In a special message to Congress, Truman

affirmed that "the communist aggression in Korea dispelled
any lingering doubts that the Kremlin is willing to threaten
the peace of the w o r l d . F r o m now until the late 1960s
these convictions hardened into dogma, inspiring a loyalty
usually reserved for truths carved in stone.
The outbreak of war confirmed the validity of the hard
line approach and the worst-case analysis.

The principles

and speculations espoused in NSC 68 became recognized as
fact.^6

A response to the Russian atomic blast of 1949,

NSC 68 was a didactic report which advocated reversing the
policy of accommodation with the Soviets.

Although not a

44Lisle A. Rose, Roots of Tragedy: The United States
and the Struggle for Asia (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press,
1976) , p. 242.
45Harry S. Truman, as cited in Rose, Roots of Tragedy,

p. 241.

-------- :
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^Commander Robert M. Laske, ed., "NSC-68: A Report to
the National Security Council," Naval War College Review 27
(May/June 197 5):51-108.
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blueprint for future action, one scholar believes that "the
document does reflect the broad perspective that governed
the major policy decisions of the Korean war period."47
The major premises of the report stated:

the world was

polarized by the forces of freedom and slavery; the struggle
was ideological in nature, especially in Asia; and only the
United States could halt Soviet designs of world hegemony if
it asserted its will.

During this period of crises, the re

port continued, world peace would be jeopardized more by the
restraint of American power than by its excessive use, for
"our fundamental purpose is more likely to be defeated from
the lack of will to maintain it, than from any mistake we may
make or assault we may undergo because of asserting that
48
will."
The report concluded:
Our position as the center of power in
the free world places a heavy responsibility
upon the United States for leadership. We
must organize and enlist the energies and
resources of the free world in a positive
program for peace which will frustrate the
Kremlin design for world domination. . . .
Without such a cooperative effort, led by
the United States, we will have to make
gradual withdrawals under pressure until
we discover one day that we have sacrificed
positions of vital interests.49
Overnight the Korean War, in dramatic fashion, crystallized
these thoughts by giving them legitimacy and an urgency to
47Ibid., p. 52.
48Ibid., pp. 108-109.
49Ibid., p. 1Q7.
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act.

After Korea, America proved willing to frustrate the

Kremlin's world ambitions and to extend its definition of
what regions were vital to its security.
America viewed the Cold War now as total, thus the
United States defined its commitment to peace as a global
task.

Previous distinctions between peripheral and vital

interests became seemingly irrelevant.

The noted commenta

tor and journalist Edward R. Murrow captured the mood of
Washington:
This action, this new policy, Commits us
to much more than the defense of the
southern half of the Korean peninsula.
We have commitments quite as binding,
obligations quite as great to Indo
china, Iran, and Turkey as we have to
Korea. We have drawn a line, not across
the peninsula, but across the world.50
After Korea the administration lived up to the rhetoric of
the Truman Doctrine.

According to the historian Arthur

Schlesinger, Jr., where "Truman at first applied his Doctrine
sparingly, events, especially after Korea, began to generalize
• +.
u 5 i
it."

While initiation of hostilities caught the administra
tion unaware, the Chinese intervention raised America's fears
of communist aggressions to a fevered pitch.

The following

remark, though made by a member of Eisenhower's Administration,
“^Edward Bliss, Jr., ed., In Search of Light: The Broad
casts of Edward R. Murrow, 1938-1961 (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1967).
51
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., as cited in Causes and Origins,
p. 72.
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expressed sentiments similar to those of Truman:
This event demonstrated beyond question not
only the solidarity of the Peiping regime's
alignment with the Communist bloc but also
its willingness and ability to resort to
open aggression in pursuit of bloc objec
tives. If there had been any doubt previ
ously about the nature of the Mao regime
it was eliminated by Communist China's
intervention in Korea.52
The significance of the Chinese intervention, according to
John Gaddis, was that it confirmed the concept of the mono
lithic nature of communism and put "an end to the assump
tion that there existed significant differences between
varieties of communism." 53
The Chinese Revolution, an increase in communist
activity, and the Korean War "made very difficult," John F.
Cady reflects, "any objective assessment by Washington of
the merits of the Communist-led nationalist in Vietnam in
particular.

In a climate of Crises and tension Washing

ton perceived Ho's policies as integral to the Kremlin's
world ambitions.

If the United States harbored any qualms

about France's colonialism, they were now reduced to insig
nificance.

Acheson, in mid-1952, announced that the world

52

Edwin Martin, "Considerations Underlying U.S.-China
Policy," Department of State Bulletin 30 (April 12, 1954):
544.
53

John Lewis Gaddis, "Reconsideration: Was the Truman
Doctrine Really A Turning Point," Foreign Affairs 52
(January 1974):397.
^Cady, Southeast Asia, p. 46.
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acknowledged "that the struggle in which the forces of the
French Union and Associated States are engaged against . . .
communist aggression in Indochina is an integral part of the
world-wide resistance by the free nations to Communist . . .
conquest.
On February 13, 1952, an NSC staff paper sharpened the
administration's thoughts concerning Indochina.
anticipated the later known "domino theory."

Its premises

It maintained

that a failure to resist communist aggression, especially by
the Chinese, would endanger the rest of Southeast Asia, the
Middle East, and Europe.

By 1952, claims Gaddis Smith,

Indochina was "the tightest knot in the tangle of issues
binding Korea, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the
57
defense of Western Europe."
On April 12, 1945, when Truman succeeded Franklin
Delano Roosevelt he did not envision a postwar world of in
tense conflict with the Soviet Union.

Nor did he foresee

that nationalism, revolution, and war would plague the Asian
ro
continent for the next seven years.
By the end of Truman's
55

Dean Acheson, "Conversations on Indochina," Department
of State Bulletin 25 (June 30, 1952):1010.
^ N S C Staff Study, "United States Objectives and Course
of Action with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast
Asia," in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 8, V.B.2., II, p. 468.
“^Smith, Acheson, p. 305.
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incumbency the Cold War pervaded every aspect of national
life.

During his farewell address to his countrymen, Tru

man speculated about his years in office:
I suppose that history will remember my
term in office as the years when the cold
war began to overshadow our lives. I have
had hardly a day in office that has not
been dominated by this all-embracing
struggle, this conflict between those who
love freedom and those who would lead the
world back to slavery and d a r k n e s s . 59
What had been unimaginable in 1945 seemed to have become in
evitable by 1953.
3. The Eisenhower Years
Dwight D. Eisenhower, unlike Truman, inherited the Cold
War, a phenomena now entrenched as a way of life in the United
States.

Eisenhower was spared the agony of being the first

President who had to react to the tensions of the Cold War.
Whereas Truman's world view and perceptions evolved and
hardened in response to the Cold War, from the beginning of
his term, Eisenhower perceived events from a Cold War per
spective.
To Charles Alexander, a leading scholar of the Eisenhower
Administration, an intense hostility towards and fear of the
communist bloc pervaded American life during his term in.
office.
5Q

In the fifties a consensus regarding the Cold War

Harry S. Truman, "The Challenge of the Cold War,"
Department of State Bulletin 27 (January 15, 1953):127.
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crystallized and most Americans "had few doubts that their
country faced a worldwide conspiracy whose center was Moscow
and whose ultimate objective was nothing less than universal
Communist conquest."^

Since it readily accepted and em

braced the basic tenets of the era, the Eisenhower Adminis
tration formulated its foreign policy within the principles
of the Cold War.
During what another leading specialist on Eisenhower de
scribed as "the most internationalist speech ever delivered
as an Inaugural A d d r e s s , E i s e n h o w e r on January 20, 1953,
depicted a world of doom and global strife in which "freedom
62
is pitted against slavery; light against darkness."
He
later defined the Cold War as the struggle transcending "all
other considerations of our times.
struggle of the ages."

63

To my mind it is the

The entire world, he said in another

speech, "was in the grip of an ideological struggle, and we
are on one side and the Iron Curtain countries are on the
other.
Central to the administration's world view was a
^Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower
Era, 1952-1961 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975),
p. 60.
^Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Cru
sades (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972), p. 165.
62
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64

Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Courage to be Patient,"
Department of State Bulletin 31 (December 15, 1954):887.

88
conviction that the communist world was monolithic.
Kremlin controlled the communist bloc,
to its goal of world domination.

The

subordinating all

The administration’s

attitude towards the Soviets was subjected to no careful
analysis of other alternatives.

"This truth requires no .

elaboration," Eisenhower affirmed, "all Americans recog
nize it as fact."65

China, according to Alfred Jenkins,

the Officer in Charge of Chinese Political Affairs, had
"followed slavishly the leadership of the Soviet Union . . .
[leaving] no doubt about its dedication to . . . world Com66
munist revolution."
The Eisenhower Administration expected
the relationship to survive for many years.

The Secretary

of State, John Foster Dulles, recognized that despite power
rivalries between Russia and China, they would remain bound
67
by ideological ties.
To protect America's interests and security against the
communist threat, the administration embraced a foreign
policy distinguished by its globalism and an emphasis upon
collective security.

Both Eisenhower and Dulles shared

the conviction that the Western response to Hitler had de
monstrated forever the futility of appeasing aggressive
65

Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Principles of U.S. Foreign
Policy," Department of State Bulletin 31 (September 15,
1954):359.
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dictatorial states.

Therefore only a dynamic foreign policy

could stem the communist encroachment upon the free world.
It was America's solemn obligation to lead this endeavor.
In so threatening a world it became difficult to differ
entiate between peripheral and vital areas.

In 1958,

Eisenhower aptly expressed the administration's world view:
"The Soviets . . .

are waging total cold war.

The only

answer to a regime that wages total cold war is to wage
total peace.
During his first State of the Union Address, the Presi
dent espoused a policy of globalism.

"The policy we embrace,"

he declared, "must be a coherent global policy.

The freedom

we cherish and defend in Europe and the Americas is no dif69
ferent from the freedom that is imperiled in Asia."
Or
as the Ambassador of Belgium said, "What happens in Asia
today affects us tomorrow."

70

Perhaps Livingston Merchant,

Assistant Secretary of European Affairs, best revealed the
administration's attitude when he said that
it is increasingly difficult to draw a sharp
distinction between national and interna
tional problems or to separate domestic poli
tics from foreign policies. . . . A local
election in a particular country may be of

^Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The State of
partment of State Bulletin 38 (January 27,
69
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merely internal interest, but it may also
be, on occasion, a decisive battle between
the forces of freedom and the forces of
slavery.71
Given this world view, American interest in Asia, including
Vietnam, gained intensity.
4. Eisenhower and Vietnam
The spectre of a Red Asia haunted the administration
throughout its tenure.

On March 29, 1954, during a speech

to the Overseas Press Club of America, Dulles reiterated
that the Soviet Union was plotting to amalgamate the people
of Southeast Asia into its orbit to further its aim of world
domination.

72

The activity of the Chinese in Southeast Asia

was a matter of grave concern to Washington.

The Chinese

Revolution had "violently changed the balance of power in the
Far East," as John Lindbeck, a member of the Bureau of Far
Eastern Affairs observed, "In effect, the Chinese Communist
conquest of the mainland extended Communist power and the
73
Soviet world into the heart of Asia."
The continuation of hostilities in Korea encouraged the
administration's proclivity to devote greater, attention to
Asian problems.

To the administration Korea was not an

71
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isolated conflict but only the most explosive front of an
area fraught with danger.

Korea, according to Dulles, was

"only a part of the world-wide effort of Communism to con
quer freedom. . . . [I]t is part of that effort in Asia
[where] a single Chinese Communist front extends from Korea
on the North to Indochina in the S o u t h , . E i s e n h o w e r ’s
Assistant Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs indicated Washing
ton’s resolve to prevent further penetration of Asia by the
Soviet Union:
We are probably justified in surmising . . .
that what the Communists are now aiming at
is to utilize their assets in China to gain
control of Southeast Asia . . . faced with
these ugly facts . . . Asia must be held
against the pressures of all kinds the Com^
munists are bringing to bear against it.-75
In this context the rise of Indochina's value in America's
eyes can better be appreciated.
As early as 1951, Eisenhower viewed Indochina from a
Cold War perspective.

The French effort was not an attempt

to sustain their colonial domination, but "was in fact a
clear case of freedom defending itself from Communist aggression."

7 f\

As President,Eisenhower justified the continuation
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of aid to the French in Indochina since its goal was "to pre
vent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the forces of inter77
national Communism."
As Washington contemplated the possibility of a French
failure in Southeast Asia, the administration concluded that
the loss of the area was unacceptable.

An NSC policy state

ment issued on January 16, 1954, concluded that "the loss of
the struggle in Indochina . . . would have the most serious
repercussions on United States and free world interests."

78

The statement argued what would later be called the "domino
theory," stating that the loss of a single country to com
munism would lead to the alignment of all of the Southeast
Asian countries with the communist camp.

Such an occurrence

would threaten the security of Japan, the Middle East, and
Europe.

During 1953, Eisenhower approved NSC 124/2 which

stated that America’s main objective in Southeast Asia was
to prevent the area from passing into the communist orbit.

79

Hence the United States would be reluctant to relinquish its
commitment to Indochina after the French debacle in 1954.
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When it became apparent that the French were failing in
Indochina, the United States faced the choice of either re
sisting or accepting the recent turn of events.

Given the

all-encompassing intensity of the Cold War milieu, the Eisen
hower Administration never gave thought of abandoning Southeast
Asia to communism any sober consideration.

During the fifties

it was unwilling or unable to renege upon America's mission of
leading the free world.
replace

France as the defender of freedom in Indochina,

By

mid-1954, the war-weary French opted for a peaceful

resolution of the
ference

Therefore, in 1954, America began to

Vietnamese conflict.

During the peace con

in Geneva the Eisenhower Administration gave the ef

fort a half-hearted endorsement at best.

"To the administra

tion," one scholar notes, "the session at Geneva could easily
become an opening wedge for Communist domination of all South80
east Asia."
Although sensitive to France's plight, the inces
sant vision of a communist Southeast Asia compelled Washington
to resist.

Dulles adamantly refused to capitulate to "the

Soviet Communist strategy . . . t o take over . . . Asia."

81

Eisenhower and his advisers feared the consequences of failure
in Indochina would invite catastrophe.

The administration

thought the French stand at Dien Bien Phu the equivalent to
"fighting a modern Thermopylae,"

82

and that "the loss of

SOParmet, Eisenhower, p. 375.
SIJohn Foster Dulles, "The Issues at Geneva," Department
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Indochina

to Communist control, either by negotiation at

Geneva or

by force

. . . would have grave consequences to

the free world.
In this atmosphere, on April 7, 1954, Eisenhower first
publicly aired the "domino theory."
Secretary

of State

Four days later, Under

Bedell Smith gave this theory dramatic

expression:
Can we allow, dare we permit, expansion of
Communist Chinese control further into Asia?
. . . the Soviet Union and Communist Chirta
have made it clear that their purpose is to
dominate all of Southeast Asia. . . . If
Indochina is lost to the Communists, Burma
is threatened, Thailand is threatened, the
Mayala Peninsula is exposed, Indonesia is
subject to the greatest danger . . . there
is the possible loss of millions and millions
of people who would disappear behind the
Iron Curtain.84
From late 1953 until the signing of the Geneva Accords in
July 1954, the Eisenhower Administration, led by the inde
fatigable Dulles, hoped to avert the French demise.

The hope

of. avoiding an inglorious defeat by the united action of the
Allied powers faded and then died.

Lack of Congressional sup

port, Eisenhower’s reluctance to employ force under the cir
cumstances, and the unwillingness of key allies to commit
themselves to united action led to the failure of Dulles’
Q *Z
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ment of State Bulletin 30 (April 19, 1954):590.
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efforts.

85

Nevertheless, though Eisenhower avoided direct

intervention of American forces in Vietnam, he moved to
bolster the strength of the free world in Southeast Asia.
With French failure imminent, Washington exerted its
energies toward the establishment of a collective security
system in Southeast Asia.

The administration hoped to apply

the policy of collective security that had been successful
in Western Europe to Southeast Asia.

Dulles observed:

that the Soviet Communist aggression in Europe
took place only against countries which had
no collective security arrangements.
Since
the organization of the North Atlantic
Treaty there has been no successful aggres
sion in Europe.8°
On July 11, 1954, an official of the administration announced
that "the United States is endeavoring to develop, as rapidly
as circumstances permit, a collective security system to stem
, the spread-of Communist forces into Southeast Asia."

87

Since it represented a setback, it was no secret that
Washington regarded the Geneva Accords to be a major defeat
for Western diplomacy.

The United States had suffered a loss

prestige as a power capable of resisting communist advance in
Southeast Asia.

In August 1954, an NSC memo expressed concern
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that Geneva and continued communist success as na serious
loss for the free world, the psychological and political ef
fects of which will be felt throughout the Far East and around
the globe."

88

The administration acted promptly to minimize

the losses inflicted by Geneva.
Dulles led the effort to utilize a collective security
system to neutralize the domino effect in Southeast Asia.
On May 11, 1954, he stated:
As the nations come together, then the ’domino
theory' so-called, ceases to apply. And what
we are trying to do is create a situation in
Southeast Asia where the domino situation will
not apply.®®
Failure to construct such a system, Walter Robertson feared,
90
would end with"the Asian pie" being eaten bit by bit.
Within a month of Geneva, an NSC policy statement proposed
that America should "exploit available means to prevent South
Vietnam from being permanently incorporated in the Soviet
91
bloc." A
The Manila Treaty of September 8 , 1954, created the
88
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Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).

This treaty

"paved the way," Eisenhower later reflected, "for a system
of true cooperation between both [Asian and Western Nations]
in the never-ending struggle to stem the tide of Communist
expansionism."

92

The signing of the treaty indicates the

administration took the "domino theory" to heart, resolved
itself to halt the spread of communism, and planned to buy
time to strengthen vulnerable areas of Southeast Asia.
The administration, however, saw little prospect that
South Vietnam would withstand the pressures of communism in
Southeast Asia.

According to Dulles, the purpose of SEATO

was "to save all of Southeast Asia if possible it can be
93

saved; if not, to save essential parts of it."

"You have

to draw the line somewhere," was how Under Secretary Smith
94
described the treaty.
The line ultimately would be drawn
across the 17th parallel in Vietnam.
United States officials realized that SEATO could not
prevent further deterioration of the free world's position
in Indochina.

Washington especially expressed skepticism

concerning the ability of Ngo Dinh Diem's government in South
Vietnam to survive.

On December 24, 1954, in a State cable

to General Lawton Collins, Dulles acknowledged that the
92
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situation in South Vietnam was rapidly disintegrating.

Appre

hension about Diem’s abilities faded before the overriding
fear of a communist takeover in South Vietnam.

No alternative

to Diem existed, Dulles argued:
Withdrawal [of] our support would hasten [the]
Communist takeover [in] Vietnam and [would]
have adverse repercussions [throughout all
of] Southeast Asia, Consequently, [our]
investment [in] Vietnam [is] justified even
if only to buy time [to] build up strength
elsewhere in [the] area.95
Yet by April 1955, the administration still pondered abandon
ing its commitment to Diem’s regime.

Diem's swift and decisive

victory against his political enemies on April 27, 1955, ef
fectively quelled these doubts.
Now Washington wholeheartedly endorsed Diem as Vietnam's
genuine and legitimate nationalist leader.

On June 1, 1956,

the Eisenhower Administration reflected this shift in policy
by acknowledging that Diem's splendid job in South Vietnam
far exceeded previous expectations.

96

The dread of a com

munist victory led the United States to support Diem's refusal
to hold national elections in 1956.

Although expressed by a

minor military official the following comment represented the
administration's policy:
95
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No one is more aware . , . that the neu
tralist world, now weighing the course of
the future, will eventually make a choice
between Communism and freedom. The ulti
mate fate of the free portion of Indochina
will become a critical element in that
choice. . . .
The loss of the rest of Indochina in
consequence of the 1956 election or other
wise,
would inevitably sway many of these
millions to Communism. Aside from its
political aspects, this trend could be
militarily disastrous. . . . If another
free world debacle in Indochina ma
terializes, . . . the U.S. military posi
tion in the Western Pacific could be
jeopardized.97
Now America proudly espoused Diem’s nationalist qualities as
they gradually replaced the French as the sole protector of
98
South Vietnam.
On April

4, 1959, Eisenhower announced the firstpublic

commitment by

the United States to maintain South Vietnam as

a separate national state*

Eisenhower evoked the harsh

realities of the Cold War and then used Vietnam to illustrate
the Soviet Union's dedication ”to promote world revolution,
destroy freedom, and communize the world."

99

Eisenhower

reiterated his faith in the domino theory and linked the free
dom of South Vietnam's to America's.

Since the Cold War posed
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a total threat to America and the free world, it was in ’’the
self-interest of each free nation . . .

to resist the loss

to imperialistic communism of the freedom and independence of
any other nation.”1^®

For these reasons, Eisenhower declared

"that our own national interests demand some help from us in
sustaining in Viet-Ham the morale, the economic progress, and
the military strength necessary to its continued existence in
Freedom."101
5. The Cold War and Vietnam
Eisenhower's legacy to John F. Kennedy went beyond con
crete commitments to Vietnam inherent in SEATO and public
rhetoric.

More importantly, his eight years as President

left the atmosphere of the Cold War intact and unaltered.
More than the specific commitments, this was a decisive fac
tor which prompted Eisenhower's successors to link Vietnam
to the vital interests of the United States.
Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
aptly voiced the intensity of this perspective:
The challenge is a global one. As long as the
principles of international communism; motivate
the regime in Moscow and Peiping, we must ex
pect that their single purpose will be the
liquidation of our form of free society and
the emergence of a Sovietized, communized
world o r d e r . 1 0 2

!01Ibid., p. 626.
102Allen W. Dulles, "The Challenge of Soviet Power,"
Department of State Bulletin 45 (April 27, 1959):583.
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In I960, the administration still adhered to its conviction
that the Soviet Union planned to strike at America indirectly
by dominating the nations of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and
Europe; thus shifting the balance of power to favor the
Soviets.
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In his farewell address of January 17, 1961,

Eisenhower described the world situation.
ideology," he warned, ''global in scope.

"We face a hostile
Unhappily the danger

it poses promises to be of indefinite nature.
Eisenhower bequeathed to Kennedy a delicate situation in
Southeast Asia.

On January 19, 1961, Eisenhower privately

alerted the President-elect "that the Communists had designs
on all of Southeast Asia."

10 S

Eisenhower added that the

crisis in Laos particularly demanded the immediate attention
of the United States.

He revived the domino theory and then

emphasized the critical importance of Laos and Southeast Asia
to America's security and treaty obligations.

More important,

he implores the new President, if necessary, to "go it alone"
in Southeast Asia.*^
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Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Diplomacy and the Modern World,"
Department of State Bulletin 48 (November 7, 1960):709.
^^Dwight D. Eisenhower, "President Eisenhower's Farewell
to the Nation," Department of State Bulletin 49 (February 6 ,
1961):180.
^Memorandum of Conference of January 19, 1961, between
President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy on the Sub
ject of Laos, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 10, V.B.3.,
IV, pp. 1360-1361.
106Ibid., p. 1367.

10*2
Earlier, during 1959, Eisenhower reflected upon the con
flict between communism and the free world; "The battle is
now joined.

The next decade will forecast its outcome.

The nature of that battle and its outcome would, in large
part, be'determined'by the successors of Eisenhower.
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Dwight P. Eisenhower, Special Message to Congress on
Hutual Security Program, March 15, 1959, in U.S.-yietnaai
Relations, look 7, V.B., p. B-45.

CHAPTER IV
PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY:
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
AND VIETNAM, 1961-1963
Now our great responsibility is to
be the chief defender of freedom in
this time of maximum danger. Only the
United States has the power and the re
sources and the determination. We have
committed ourselves to the defense of
dozens of countries stretched around
the globe who look to us for independ
ence, who look to us for the defense of
their freedom.*
John F. Kennedy
According to popular legend, on January 20, 1961, a young
and charismatic President passed a torch to a new generation
of Americans.

His inauguration supposedly marked an abrupt

departure from America's traditional domestic and foreign
policies.

In actuality, the differences between Dwight 0.

Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy were more a matter of style
and age than of substance.

In foreign affairs the new admin

istration initially conducted its policy within what Henry
Kissinger labeled the "undifferentiated globalism" of the
i
John F K e n n e d y , Democratic Dinner. Party in Chicago,
April 28, 1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:802.
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Eisenhower Administration.

2

Coral Bell, a respected scholar

of international affairs, considers Kennedy's inaugural address
the rhetorical zenith of ideological, Cold War moralism.

3

The Cold War, for the new occupant of 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue, continued to be the overriding concern in interna
tional politics and the defining characteristic of the age.
Newsweek's attitude was indistinguishable from that of the
administration's:

"The greatest single problem that faces

John Kennedy - and the key to most of his other problems - is
how to meet the aggressive power of the Communist bloc."^
Unlike the Eisenhower Administration, Kennedy and his advisers
displayed an eagerness and readiness to respond to the chal
lenges of the Cold War.

During an interview on February 9,

1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk described the new adminis

tration:
What the United States does or what the United
States does not do in the world . . . makes
a great deal of difference to what happens in
this turbulent tempestuous period. . . . Now
the United States can make an enormous differ
ence to the shape of the world to come by
taking an active and . . . constructive role
in the world. And I believe that President
Kennedy's leadership will give us a new in
volvement and concern with . . . these great
tides of history.5
2

Coral Bell, "Kissinger in Retrospect: The Diplomacy of
Power-Concert?," International Affairs 53 (April ’1977) :20-23Ibid.
^Newsweek 57 (January 23, 1961):25v
3Dean Rusk, "Secretary Rusk Interviewed on 'Today' Show,"
U.S., Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 44
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Addressing an audience at the University of California in
Berkeley, Rusk captured Washington's view of the world and
of itself:

"It would be a mistake for us to underestimate

the formidable contest in which we shall be engaged in the
decade of the sixties. . . . Our role cannot be passive.

. . .

The United States must lead."^
Washington considered the primary threat to world peace
and America's security to be an aggressive communist bloc,
controlled by the Soviet Union.

Chester Bowles, Acting Sec

retary of State, stated clearly the administration's view:
"In Berlin, Southeast Asia, Cuba, and elsewhere the Communist
movement poses an unremitting challenge to our strength of
will, our firmness of purpose, and our intelligence." 7

Con

fident of America's strength in conventional and nuclear war
fare, Kennedy feared that America stood vulnerable to guerrilla
wars, the "Achilles' heel" of America's defenses.
1. Wars of National Liberation
Kennedy expected confrontation with the Soviets in what
he called "the lands of the rising peoples:"

(February 23, 1961):306-307.
of State Bulletin.

Africa, Asia,

(Hereafter cited as Department

^Dean Rusk, "Charter Day Address," Department of State
Bulletin 44 (April 10, 1961):516.
7
Chester Bowles, "It is Time to Reaffirm Our National
Purpose," Department of State Bulletin 45 (November 27,
1961):879.
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and the Middle East.

8

During his first State of the Union

Address, the President warned that neither the Soviets nor
the Chinese would relinquish their designs'"for. world domi
nation - ambitions which they forcefully restated only a
9
short time ago.”
Kennedy was referring presumably to Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev's threat to eat away at America's
security.

Though not a major statement of Soviet policy,

Kennedy took Khrushchev's espousal of wars of national libera
tion to heart.
Prior to his election, Kennedy and others had voiced
alarm concerning America's capacity of resisting communist
aggression.

10

Kennedy was persuaded that America's reliance

on massive retaliation was excessive, unwise, and inadequate.
Since it exposed a weakness in America's military defenses,
communist guerrilla warfare caused particular concern.

On

February 29, 1960, Senator Kennedy had revealed his anxiety
regarding America's ability to counter effectively this new
type of warfare:
But both before and after 1953 events have
demonstrated that our nuclear retaliatory
power is not enough.
It cannot deter Communist
aggression which is too limited to justify
8
John F. Kennedy, "Urgent National Needs,” Department of
State Bulletin 44 (May 12, 1961):903.
^John F. Kennedy, "The State of the Union," Department
of State Bulletin 44 (February 13, 1961):210.
10

The recently retired General of the Army, Maxwell
Taylor, expressed similar concern about America's military
capacity. Taylor became Kennedy's Special Military Repre
sentative in 1961. See Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960).

107
atomic war.
It cannot protect uncommitted
nations against a Communist takeover using
local or guerrilla forces.
It cannot be
used in so-called brush-fire peripheral
wars.
In short, it cannot prevent the Com
munists from gradually nibbling at the
fringe of the free world's territory and
strength, until our security has been
steadily eroded in piecemeal fashion.
Guerrilla wars presumably were sponsored by the Soviets.
Hence guerrilla warfare was a dangerous threat to the world's
balance of power.

12

Armed with this conviction Kennedy came

to the White House in 1961.
To defeat this ominous threat necessitated a novel ap
proach to the problem.

Khrushchev's lengthy, though routine,

speech on January 6 , 1961, lent urgency to the need of shoring
up America's capabilities.

Khrushchev had espoused communism

as the wave of the future.

He further--but briefly--advocated

Soviet support of wars of national liberation, specifically
communist advances in Cuba and Vietnam.

Apparently the speech

was also aimed at Chinese ears, with the support of these wars
a minor point not representative of major Soviet policy.

13

Due to his previous concerns, fears, and perceptions of Soviet
11

Senator John F. Kennedy, Congressional Speech, February
29, 1960, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:798.
12

Douglas Blaufarb, a leading specialist on counter
insurgency, asserts that while one can appreciate why this
school of thought gained prominence; its fears and basic
premises had little basis in fact. See Douglas Blaufarb, The
Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to
the Present (New York: Free Press, 1977) , p p . 15-20.
13

Blaufarb, Counterinsurgency Era, p. 54.
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ambitions, Kennedy interpreted the speech at face value.
Khrushchev merely confirmed Kennedy's suspicion that the
I
communists' reliance on guerrilla warfare presented the free
world with its greatest challenge of the coming decade.

The

administration viewed the speech as an authoritative state
ment of Soviet policy.

Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the Policy

Planning Council, elaborated upon its significance:
Thus when we read Mr. Khrushchev's speech
of January 6, 1961, and the blessing he gave
to the methods of subversion and guerrilla
warfare, we took this matter very seriously
indeed. We regard the challenge not merely
as a series of regional crises but part of
a general Communist offensive designed to
corrode the free world without confronting
either our nuclear or conventional strength.
All the potentialities existed in January
1961 for the spread of Communist power by
these methods into Southeast Asia, Africa,
and Latin America.14
Kennedy read aloud relevant sections of.Khrushchev's speech
during the first meeting of his National Security Council.
Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy's chief military adviser, stated that
the President "took very seriously Khrushchev's speech of
January 6, 1961, which promised Soviet support on a global
basis for People's Wars or Wars of Liberation on the model
of the guerrilla war in South V i e t n a m . T h e meeting produced
14

Walt W. Rostow, "Where We Stand," Department of State
Bulletin 46 (June 18, 1962):967.
15

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 399. See also Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the
White House (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1967), pp. 282284.
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a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 2) which advocated
an increase in America's counterinsurgency resources.
In April, Cuban exiles with the blessing of the United
States invaded Cuba with the intention of overthrowing Fidel
Castro's regime.

The Bay of Pigs disaster reinforced Ken

nedy's conviction that these liberation wars posed a grave
threat to America's security and world peace.

After Kennedy's

self-admitted failure, he talked of its lessons:
We dare not fail to see the insidious
nature of this new and deeper struggle.
We dare not fail to grasp the new con
cepts, the new tools, the new sense of
urgency we will need to combat it -whether in Cuba or South Viet-nam. . . .
No greater task faces this nation or
this administration. No other challenge
is more deserving of our every effort and
energy. Too long we have fixed our eyes
on traditional military needs. . . . Now
it should be clear that this is no longer
enough -- that our security may be lost
piece by piece, country by country, without
the firing of a single missile or the
crossing of a single border.
We intend to profit from this lesson.
We intend to re-examine and reorient our
forces of all kinds. . . . Let me then
make clear as . . . President . . . that
I am determined upon our system's survival
and success, regardless of the cost, re
gardless of t h e p e r i l . 1 6
Counterinsurgency became the President's personal project.

At

a news conference on April 21, 1961, Kennedy specified guerrilla warfare as among the eminent challenges of the sixties. 17
*^John F. Kennedy, "The Lessons of Cuba," Department of
State Bulletin 44 (May 18, 1961):660-661.
17

U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
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The Vienna Summit with Khrushchev during the summer of 1961
did not assuage Kennedy's apprehension.
Kennedy arrived in Vienna with America’s prestige at
its lowest ebb since the U-2 incident of 1959.

If Kennedy

hoped to cure Khrushchev of his perception of the President
as a weak and indecisive leader, then he met great disappoint
ment.

Nor did he resolve with Khrushchev the issue of the

wars of liberation.

The tense and sometimes hostile atmosphere

magnified Kennedy’s anxiety over Soviet ambitions.

One eye

witness, the respected news columnist, James Reston, recalls
that Kennedy emerged from the room angry and shaken.

Kennedy

fretted that the Soviet statesman thought him young, irtex18
perienced, and easily intimidated.
Kennedy returned to the
United States determined to disabuse Khrushchev of his faulty
perception.

With a heightened alarm regarding Soviet Support

of liberation wars, Kennedy conveyed his impressions of
Khrushchev to the American people:
Most of all, he predicted the triumph of Com
munism in the new and less developed countries.
He was certain that the tide there.was
moving his way, that the revolution of rising
peoples would eventually be a Communist revo
lution, and that the so-called wars of libera
tion, supported by the Kremlin, would replace
the old methods of direct aggression and in
vasion.19
Register National Archives and Record Service, 1961- ), John F.
Kennedy, 1961, p. 311.
(Hereafter cited John F. Kennedy, Public
Papers.)
James Reston, "What Was Killed Was Not Only the Presi
dent but the Promise," in John F. Kennedy and the New Frontier,
ed. Ai'da DiPace Donald (New York: Hill and Wang, 1966), p. 225.
19john F. Kennedy, Public Papers, 1961, p. 444.

Ill
Kennedy concluded emphatically that "it was clear that this
area of the new and poorer nations will be a continuing crisis
of the decade."

20

In this context Kennedy's initial decisions

regarding Vietnam were made.
2. Vietnam: The Early Decisions
Cold War tensions throughout the world marked Kennedy's
first year in office.

"From Laos . . . to Berlin," according

to New York Times columnist Russell Baker, "crisis after
crisis has fallen across the White House with a rapidity and
gravity that has absorbed Mr. Kennedy's energy since his
21
inauguration."
Although the import of Vietnam dwindled in
comparison to the crises in Berlin or Cuba, the very existence
of strains in Soviet-American relations augmented the stakes
in Vietnam.

"It would not have been easy for members of the

Kennedy administration," the historian Ernest May notes, "to
see Southeast Asia as anything but a battlefield in the Cold
War."

22

Hostilities in Vietnam were interpreted not according

to the country's history, culture, or traditions but through
the prism of the Cold War.
In this climate 1961 was a difficult year for the United
States to make concessions, real or imagined, to what was
20Ibid., p. 445.
21

New York Times columnist Russell Baker, as cited in
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:72-73.
99

Ernest R. May, "Lessons," p. 101.
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perceived as an intransigent and dangerous communist bloc.
According to Kennedy's court historian, Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., "given the truculence of Moscow, the Berlin crisis, and
the resumption of nuclear testing, the President unquestionably
felt that an American retreat in Asia might upset the whole
23
world balance."
On September 25, 1961, Kennedy himself
warned that if America failed to defeat communist aggression
in Southeast Asia then "the gates will be opened wide" to com
munism throughout the world.24
Was Kennedy's reaction exaggerated, even extreme or
hysterical?
be.

Perhaps from a later perspective it appears to

But Douglas Blaufarb points out that historical hind

sight distorts as well as illuminates the past:
In the early sixties the threat of a
monolithic and expansionistic Communism was
not so easily dismissed. The expansionistic
thrust of Khrushchev's rhetoric, his pressure
on Berlin . . . could not be waved aside.
His verbal commitment to 'wars of national
liberation' was easily misread as a new
global initiative in view of events in
Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba. . . ,'*25
The communist threat, perceived as real, dramatically influ
enced American policy in Vietnam.
For America's commitment to universal peace, a threat to
order anywhere represented a threat to peace everywhere.
23

Dean

Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 506.

24John F. Kennedy, "Let Us Call a Truce to Terror," De
partment of State Bulletin 45 (October 16, 1961):623.
25

Blaufarb, Counterinsurgency Era, p. 297.
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Rusk's adamant rejection of a newsman's observation that the
United States was bogging down in unimportant areas of the
world epitomized the administration's attitude.

Rusk argued

the contrary:
Because if you don't pay attention to the
periphery, the periphery changes. And the
first thing you know the periphery is the
center.
I mean, peace and security are
worldwide. That is particularly true these
days, when the doctrine of a historically
inevitable world revolution, backed by ac
tion, is in confrontation with the world
right around the globe. And what happens
in one place cannot help but affect what
happens in another.26
With this definition of peripheral areas, Vietnam's security
and well-being were linked to America's.
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of Political
Affairs, explicitly linked Southeast Asia's future to that of
America.

Johnson calculated that Asia's emergence would be

among the era's more significant events.

Therefore he added

"these emerging nations may well hold the key to the world of
tomorrow.

. . . our ability to permit this revolution to un

fold and not be turned back by communism, is crucial to our
own future."

27

By early 1961, the administration feared that Ngo Dinh
Diem's government lacked the capacity to resist effectively
communist aggression against South Vietnam.

Khrushchev's

o/r

Dean Rusk, "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 4,"
Department of State Bulletin 44 (May 22, 1961):763.
27
U. Alexis Johnson, "The Emerging Nations of Asia,"
Department of State Bulletin 46 (January 15, 1962):53.
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January 6 speech already had alerted Kennedy to the dangers
of guerrilla war in Vietnam.

Actual hostilities were neces

sary to awaken others to its implications.

According to

Maxwell Taylor, "it required an increase in Vietcong terror
ism and guerrilla activity in South Vietnam during 1961 to
make clear what Khrushchev was talking about in his January
28
address."
Renewed conflict in Vietnam, Taylor continued,
revealed only what history had already made evident:
It was true that a War of National Libera
tion was but a new name for an old game which
had been played previously in the Greek Civil
War, in the Huk insurrection in the Philip
pines, in the guerrilla warfare in Malaya,
and in Castro's rebellion in Cuba. They all
had the common identifying mark of subver
sive aggression for the overthrow of a nonCommunist government. . . . This was the new
technique which Khrushchev in Russia, Mao in
China, and Ho in North Vietnam united in pro
claiming as the preferred means for the
future expansion of militant Communism. . . .
This was the threat which President Kennedy
perceived and against which he wished to
erect defenses.29
Vietnam became the testing ground for the West's ability to
counter effectively guerrilla warfare.

30

On April 6, 1961, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Roswell Gilpatric issued a Task Force Report on Vietnam.
report did not lower Kennedy's apprehension.

The

Hanoi's Central

Committee of the North Vietnamese Communist Party and the Viet
^Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares, p. 200.
Ibid.
■^Ibid., p. 202. Maxwell Taylor: "The President repeat
edly emphasized his desire to utilize the situation in Vietnam
to study the techniques and equipment related to counter
insurgency. "
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Cong were matching with deeds their professed intention to
smash Diem's government, it stated, that the situation, though
not hopeless, had reached a critical stage.

Alexis Johnson,

also a leading specialist of the Far East, linked the Vietnam
crisis to the Cold War in general:

"The turmoil created

throughout the area by this rapid succession of events pro
vides an ideal environment for the Communist 'master plan'
31
to take over all of Southeast Asia."
Although the Bay of Pigs fiasco tempered whatever incli
nation Kennedy had of sending troops during the Laotian crisis,
he was not disposed to renege on America's commitment to South
32
Vietnam.
In fact, the neutralist solution increased the
pressure to stand firm in Vietnam.

33

On March 28, 1961, a

National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued by the CIA stated
that throughout Southeast Asia countries considered Laos to
be "a symbolic test of strengths between the major powers of
34
the West and the Communist bloc."
But since international
cooperation defused the Laotian conflict, the "symbolic test"
shifted to Vietnam.

In late 1961, Alexis Johnson drafted a

31Task Force Report, "A Program of Action to Prevent Com
munist Domination of South Vietnam: Appraisal of the Situation,"
April 12, 1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:36.
32

Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Bantam Books,
1966), p. 736. Those who advocated intervention in Cuba also
recommended similar action regarding Laos. Kennedy revealed
to Sorenson: "Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did.
Otherwise we'd be in Laos by now--and that would be a hundred
times worse."
33

Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:51-55.

34National Intelligence Estimate, March 28, 1961, in
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:33.
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policy statement, "Concept of Intervention in Vietnam,"
which, according to an anonymous editor of the so-called
"Pentagon Papers," concluded that if the administration was
unwilling to save Laos, it should at least "take a strong
and unambiguous action to make sure that Vietnam would not
also be lost."

35

Strong action, the statement implied,

meant if necessary the introduction of American combat
troops.
This was not the first time that Kennedy’s advisers had
confronted him with proposals to intervene in Vietnam.

The

Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 10, 1961, "assuming that the
political decision is to hold Southeast Asia outside the Com
munist sphere," recommended to Kennedy, "that U.S. forces be
deployed immediately to Vietnam."

36

The next day, McGeorge

Bundy, the Presidential Adviser on National Security Affairs,
approved NSAM 52, which endorsed the recommendations of the
JCS, including the goal "to prevent Communist domination of
South Vietnam."

37

Nevertheless, Kennedy refused to make the

issue of combat troops the "touchstone" of America’s good
r ... 38
faith.
35

"Concept of Intervention in Vietnam," October 10, 1961,
in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:76.
3fj
Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, May 10, 1961, in
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:49.
37

National Security Action Memorandum 52, May 11, 1961,
in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:642.
"^Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 737.
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Although unwilling to commit troops, Kennedy had not
abandoned the goal of the April Task Force, "that come what
may the U.S. intends to win this battle."

39

The next few

months brought little respite in Cold War hostilities; pres
sures pushing the United States toward greater involvement
in Vietnam continued unabated.

Kennedy had improved a new

counterinsurgency plan involving a budget of forty-two
million dollars, increased the number of United States mili
tary advisers, and used American money to increase the number
of Vietnamese armed forces.

40

The temporary seizure of

Phuoc Vinh, a provincial capital, on September 27, 1961,
indicated that more aid was needed.

Schlesinger observed

that "Kennedy, absorbed as he was in Berlin and nuclear test41
ing, faced a series of inescapable decisions in Vietnam."
Hence, in October he sent Rostow and Taylor on their fateful
mission to South Vietnam.
The mission arrived in Saigon on the eighteenth, and on
November 3 Taylor dispatched an "Eyes Only" report to Kennedy
and his Secretaries of Defense and State.

Forcefully and

directly, Taylor concluded that the strategy of guerrilla war
fare, which enabled the communists to Circumvent America's
traditional sources of strength, had approached the threshold
39

•
Task Force Report, "A Program of Action," April 12,
1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:36.
40W. W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent
History (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972), p. 269.
41Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p. 503.
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of victory in Southeast Asia.

The weakness of Diem's govern

ment and America's reluctance to act with decisive force,
were the reasons Taylor gave for the recent successes by the
communists.

Although Taylor explicitly acknowledged that

Vietnam constituted a peripheral area, he strongly urged
Kennedy to introduce "U.S. military force" to Vietnam.42
The stakes in Vietnam transcended mere regional concerns
and Taylor implored Kennedy to act decisively:
It is my judgment . . . that the United
States must decide how it will cope with
Khrushchev's 'wars of liberation1 which
are really para-wars of guerrilla aggres
sion. This is a new and dangerous Com
munist technique which bypasses our
traditional political and military re
sponses . . . we must declare our inten
tions to aittack the source of guerrilla
aggression. 43
Taylor further betrayed his conviction that the Cold War de
fined the nature of the Vietnamese conflict when he encouraged
Kennedy to instruct Moscow to "use its .influence with Ho Chi
Minh to call his dogs off."

44

McNamara and Rusk enclosed Taylor's recommendation.

On

November 8, 1961, Kennedy received a memo from McNamara which
argued that unless the administration bolstered its commit
ment to Vietnam with military force, Southeast Asia would be
lost to communism.

Three days later in a joint memorandum,

42"Eyes Only for the President from General Taylor,"
November 3, 1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:89.
43Ibid., 2:98.
44Ibid., 2:99.
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McNamara and Rusk concurred that "the United States should
commit itself to the clear objective Of preventing the fall
of South Vietnam to Communism.
Kennedy, though reluctant to go this far or to commit
troops, still faced the prospect of defeat with disquiet.
By the end of 1961, the United States advisory fo'rces had
doubled and concern over communist gains in Southeast Asia
carried over into 1962.

The JCS throughout January reiterated

its conviction that the guerrilla war in Vietnam was " a
planned phase in the Communist timetable for world domina46
tion."
America must resist these moves if it valued its
credibility as a responsible world leader.

Kennedy kept

abreast of recent developments in Vietnam but other world
affairs demanded his attention in 1962.
3. The Sino-Soviet Split and the
Cuban Missile Crisis
Early in 1962, the administration publicly acknowledged
the existence of the Sino-Soviet split.

Yet this recognition

did not cause fundamental change in the administration’s world
view.

Ironically, the Special Assistant to the Under Secre

tary for Political Affairs, Theodore Achilles, responded to

^Memorandum for the President, "South Vietnam," Novem
ber 8 , 1961, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:111.
Afi

JCSM-33-62 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
"The Strategic Importance of Southeast Asia," in Gravel,
Pentagon Papers, 2:664.
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this phenomena with his prior perceptions intact.

The basic

Soviet and Chinese objective of world domination, Achilles
reaffirmed, remained steadfast.
tactics, not goals.

The difference was over

"Let us not be deceived," he warned,
A *7

"let us never forget basic Soviet objectives."

Then,

directing his attention to Southeast Asia, he maintained that
the communist world displayed "no signs of inhibiting its
predilection for 'wars of national liberation,1 brushfire
wars which it can persuade others to fight . . . proxy as in
Laos or Vietnam."

48

Given Soviet and Chinese goals, Achilles

concluded that America must prepare for the worst; this re
quired the development of forces capable of deterring such
proxy wars.
The view had acquired official sanction during an inter
view with Dean Rusk.

On the "Today" television show he said:

We . . . ought not suppose that these dif
ferences are any great comfort to us at the
present time, because this argument is
really about how best to get on with the
world revolution of communism as they see
it. They're committed to that in Moscow;
they're committed to that in Peiping.
Their argument is about the difference in
procedures by which they would accomplish
their

p u r p o s e . 49

Therefore the Sino-Soviet split produced no reexamination of
^Theodore Achilles, "Peaceful Coexistence and U.S.
Security," Department of State Bulletin 46 (February 26,
1962):325.
48Ibid.
49Dean Rusk, "Secretary Rusk Interviewed on 'Today'
Show," Department of State Bulletin 46 (February 12, 1962):
241.
:
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the conflict in Vietnam.

Quite the contrary, rather than

soothe American nerves, the split increased Washington's
fears of an unleashed China in Southeast Asia.
An event which did result in an examination of the basic
tenets of the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Although

the actual crisis involving the Soviet attempt to place offen
sive missiles in Cuba is outside the scope of this study, its
impact on world politics certainly is not.

"We may find our

selves at an important turning point in history, at a watershed of the cold war as we have known it,"

50

one administra

tion official reflected upon the significance of approaching
the brink of a nuclear war.

While it is commonly recognized

that Soviet-American relations subsequently improved, the
question that remains is what effect did this have on Vietnam
policy?
While Kennedy conceded that a foundation for future
detente with the Soviets existed, he nevertheless understood
that basic differences imposed limitations upon such coopera
tion.

Speaking at the University of Maine almost a year after

the missile crisis, Kennedy cautioned that "there still were
major areas of tension and conflict, from Berlin . . . to
Southeast Asia . . . [including] wholly different views on
the so-called wars of liberation," which continued to divide
51
the superpowers.
The avoidance of nuclear war over Cuba
50Harlan Cleveland, "A Most Dangerous Time," Department
of State Bulletin 47 (December 10, 1962):880.
51

John F. Kennedy, "Strength for Peace and Strength for
War," Department of State Bulletin 49 (November 4, 1963):695.
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did not mollify Kennedy’s misgivings over liberation wars.
In a national address on December 17, 1962, Kennedy reluc
tantly concluded that Khrushchev still retained his faith
that Soviet "support of these wars of liberation, small wars,
will bring about our defeat.

. . . Mr. Khrushchev does not

wish us well, unfortunately."

52

Hence, although the missile

crisis encouraged a cautious reexamination of American atti
tudes toward the Cold War, the impact of this process on
American policy in Vietnam was minimal.
Similarly, American attitudes toward the Sino-Soviet
split did not change after Cuba either.

Roger Hilsman ad

monished that "our problems in Viet-nam and Laos, Cuba and
Berlin have not disappeared because of the Sino-Soviet
split."

53

Disquietude about communist activity in Southeast

Asia actually intensified.

U. Alexis Johnson commented on

the split:
Nor does it mean that Communism is going to
present fewer dangers to us. In fact, the
greater belligerence of the Chinese Com
munists, unrestrained by Soviet caution,
may present greater dangers, particularly
in areas around China's borders.54
Rusk displayed impatience with these fine distinctions: "Both
principal Communist powers are committed to a Communist world

52John F, Kennedy, Public Papers, 1963, p. 900.
^^Roger Hilsman, "The Sino-Soviet Split," Department of
State Bulletin 47 (November 26, 1962): 808.
54U. Alexis Johnson, "Red China and the U.S.S.R.,"
Department of State Bulletin 48 (February 25, 1963):277.
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system. . . . That gives us no reason to relax our guard." 55
As Kennedy declared in his State of the Union Address, "A
dispute over how to bury the West is no grounds for Western
rejoicing.
Kennedy’s speeches after the missile crisis were often
a mixture of hope and alarm.

In Maine he declared, "There

are new rays of hope on the horizon, but we still live in
the shadows of war."

57

Soon those shadows would loom darkest

in Vietnam.
4. Vietnam: A Year of Crisis
"The spearhead of aggression," a confident Kennedy pro
claimed in January 1963, "has been blunted in South Viet58
nam."
But the optimism expressed in this State of the
Union Address proved misplaced.

A year of continued crisis,

turmoil and tragedy in South Vietnam would follow.
The year began with hope and on May 6 , 1963, McNamara
announced the withdrawal of a thousand military personnel.
By June, the tenuous nature of Diem's hold on the Vietnamese
people became evident.

The shock waves emitted by the

55Ibid., p. 283.
^ J o h n F. Kennedy, "The State of the Union,'! Department
of State Bulletin 48 (February 4, 1963):162.
57

John F. Kennedy, "Strength for Peace and Strength for
War," Department of State Bulletin 49 (November 4, 1963):695.
58

John F. Kennedy, "The State of the Union," Department
of State Bulletin 48 (February 4, 1963):159.
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Buddhist crisis in June revealed the fragility of South Viet
nam's government.

South Vietnam's internal emergency con

tinued throughout the summer and fall.

But debate centered

upon Diem and alternatives to his rule, rather than prompting
a reappraisal of America's commitment to South Vietnam.
Frederick E. Nolting, America's Ambassador to Saigon, warned
that if the Buddhist crisis spread "the country might be lost
to the Communists," an outcome the administration was unwilling
to accept.

59

Kennedy, during a mid-July news conference, reaffirmed
America's commitment to Vietnam:

"we are not going to with

draw from that effort . . . for us to withdraw from that
effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but
of Southeast Asia."^

Even as the situation became critical

Kennedy insisted to Walter Cronkite of CBS that America must
stand firm in its commitment.

Seven days later, on Septem

ber 9, in response to a question asked by NBC's David Brinkley,
Kennedy frankly declared his faith in the "domino theory:"
No, I believe it.
I believe it. I think
that the struggle is close enough. China
is so large, looms so high just beyond the
frontiers, that if South Vietnam went, it
would not only give them an improved geo
graphic position for a guerrilla assault
on Malaya but would also give the impres
sion that the wave of the future in South
east Asia was China and the Communists.
So I believe it.^l
59pj.edgj.jxk
Papers, 2 :231.

e

. Nolting, as cited in Gravel, Pentagon

60john F. Kennedy, Public Papers, 1963, p. 569.
61"President Kennedy's NBC Interview," September 9,
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Therefore despite unease and increased exasperation with
Diem’s rule, America’s commitment to South Vietnam remained
firm.
McNamara and Taylor returned to Vietnam in October to
evaluate the situation and to recommend a redirection of
policy as needed.

Though confident regarding the military

situation, they were vexed about South Vietnam's political
instability.

The White House issued a statement on October 2:

The security of South Viet-nam is a major
interest of the United States. . . . We will
adhere to our policy of working with the
people of and government of South Viet-nam
to deny this country to Communism.62
The bloody overthrow of Diem's regime in November would end
temporarily the political unrest of South Vietnam.

Though

shaken by Diem's sudden demise, one can surmise that Vietnam's
recent tragedy receded in Kennedy's mind as he triumphantly
toured Dallas on November 22, 1963.

Within weeks of each

other, both Diem and Kennedy were dead.
5. An Ambiguous Legacy
When Richard Neustadt evaluated Kennedy's presidency,
his general remarks also applied to the specific case of
Vietnam:

"We cannot know what Kennedy's full record would

have been. . . . Still more important, we can never know

1963, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:828.
^"U. S. Policy on Vietnam: White House Statement,"
October 2, 1963, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:850.
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precisely how to weigh events in his truncated term.*'

fi%

Eight days before his untimely death, Kennedy displayed un
certainty regarding Vietnam when he juxtaposed rhetoric
about America's global responsibilities with an expressed
desire to withdraw American personnel.
questions defined the debate:

A series of rambling

"What American policy should

be, and what our aid policy should be, how can we intensify
the struggle, how can. we bring Americans out of there?"^
Would Kennedy have implemented the earlier recommendations
and endorsements of McNamara, Rostow, Ruslc, and Taylor to
increase the level of America's force?

Or, would he have

allowed the suggestions of Paul Kattenburg and Robert Kennedy
to evolve into a policy of disengagements?^

We do not know,

and we never will.
According to Schlesinger, after Diem's overthrow and
murder, Kennedy "realized that Vietnam was his greatest failure
in foreign policy, and that he had never really given it his
full attention."

66

Reston's comment supports this contention:

He could be ambiguous and even indecisive on
secondary questions. . . . He . . . temporized
with the Vietnamese crisis, partly supporting
those who wanted to intervene 'to win,' partly
joining those who reminded him that the French

^Richard E. Neustadt, "Kennedy in the Presidency: A Pre
mature Appraisal," in Donald, Kennedy, p. 2 34.
^ J o h n F. Kennedy, Public Papers, 1963, p. 847.
^Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:213-214, 241-243. Katten
burg was a member of the State Department's Vietnam Working
Group.
66schlesinger, Thousand Days, pp. 909-910.
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had suffered 175,000 casualties against the
same Communist army, but never really de
fining his aims or reconciling his power
with his objectives.67
For Reston, Kennedy’s qualities of leadership emerged only
during acute crises.

Tragically, just as the situation in

Vietnam became critical, Kennedy was killed in Dallas,

With

the coup against Diem a crossroad of decision was reached in
Vietnam,

A man other than Kennedy would choose what road to

take.

^Reston, "What Was Killed,” p. 225.

CHAPTER V
PROBLEMS OF PERCEPTION IN DIPLOMACY:

THE

JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION AND THE DECISION
TO INTERVENE IN VIETNAM, 1963-1965
So what is our stake? What is our com
mitment in that situation? Can those of
us in this room forget the lesson that we
had in this issue of war and peace when it
was only 10 years from the seizure of Man
churia to Pearl Harbor; about 2 years from
the seizure of Czechoslavkia to the out
break of World War II in Western Europe?
Don’t you remember the hopes expressed in
those days: that perhaps the aggressor
will be satisfied by this next bite, and
perhaps he will be quiet? Remember that?
. . , But we found that ambition and appe
tite fed upon success and the next bite
generated the appetite for the following
bite. And we learned that, by postponing
the issue, we made the result more terrible,
the holocaust more dreadful. We cannot
forget that experience.^
Dean Rusk
The Kennedy legacy in Vietnam may cause intense debate
among historians but Lyndon Baines Johnson never participated
in this fascinating exercise.

As President, Johnson empha

sized his Vietnam policy's continuity with that pf his
T
Dean Rusk, "Some Fundamentals of American Foreign
Policy," Department of State Bulletin 51 (March 22, 1965):
401.
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predecessors.

Johnson maintained that his actions in Viet

nam "were consistent with the goals the United States had
been trying to accomplish in the world since 1945."

2

Three

days after Kennedy's assassination, Johnson approved a Na
tional Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 273) stating that
the United States would "persevere in the policies and actions in which we were already engaged."

3

Before a Joint

Session of Congress on November 27, Johnson vowed that "this
nation will keep its commitments from South Viet-Nam to West
Berlin.
1. Vietnam: The Situation Worsens
"Asia is not on fire," Roger Hilsman reflected, but
"portions of it smoulder with each morning's headlines."5
From late 1963 until early 1965 South Vietnam burned slowly;
its eruption into flame would confront Johnson with the
greatest challenge of his presidency.

During the early

months of its tenure, the administration harbored hopes of
disengagement and withdrawal from Vietnam.

A White House

2

Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives
of the Presidency. 1965-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1971), p. 42.
5Ibid., p. 45.
^Lyndon Johnson, "An Hour of Sorrow, A Time for Action,"
Department of State Bulletin 49 (December 16, 1963):910.
5Roger Hilsman, "United States Policy Toward Communist
China," Department of State Bulletin 50 (January 6 , 1964):
11 .
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statement issued on March 17, 1964 indicated a possible
recall of American personnel.^

But this sentiment was

countered by a firm commitment to South Vietnam's security.
McNamara, in a memo to Johnson, acknowledged that though
a withdrawal of American personnel was highly desirable the
high stakes in Vietnam justified an intensive effort by the
United States.

Later that month, on January 27, McNamara

testified before the House Armed Services Committee:
The survival of an independent government in
South Viet-Nam is so important to the se
curity of Southeast Asia and to the free
world that I can conceive of no alternative
other than to take all necessary measures
within our capability to prevent a Communist
victory.®
South Vietnam's predicament disheartened the administration.
By late

March, the administration realized that sinceDiem's

fallthe situation

in Vietnam had deteriorated rapidly.

first coup since Diem's had occurred in January.

The

Within a

year six more coups would plague the political viability of
South Vietnam.

Washington's concern heightened with the

expectation that Hanoi and the Viet Cortg (the National Front
for the Liberation of Vietnam) would exploit the political
turmoil which afflicted Saigon.

^White House Press Release, March 17, 1964, in Gravel,
Pentagon Papers, 2:196-197.
7
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara Memorandum to the
President, February 1964, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:196197.
8

Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel, Roots of Involvement (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1971), p. 165.
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On February 13, a disturbing report crossed the Secre
tary of State's desk.

Authored by Walt Rostow, it con

cluded that South Vietnam was in imminent danger.

Rostow

minimized the internal weakness of South Vietnam's govern
ment by placing emphasis upon Hanoi*s systematic aggression
from the north.

A later trip taken by Taylor (now Chair

man of the JCS) and McNamara to Vietnam gave Washington
little comfort in respect to the precarious position of
South Vietnam.

Their pessimistic assessment was later in

corporated within NSAM 288.

It recommended an enlargement

of America's efforts and advocated the necessity of a free
Vietnam:
Unless we can achieve this objective in
South Vietnam almost all of Southeast Asia
will probably fall under Communist domi
nance . . . accommodate to Communism so far
as to remove effective U.S. and anti
communist influence or fall under the domi
nation of forces not now explicitly Com
munist but likely . . . to become so.
All of these consequences would probably
have been true even if the U.S. had not
v
since 1954, and especially since 1961, be
come so heavily engaged in South Vietnam.
However, that fact accentuates the impact
of a Communist South Vietnam not only in
Asia, but in the rest of the world, where
the South Vietnamese conflict is regarded
as a test case of U.S. capacity to help a
nation meet a Communist 'war of libera
tion. '10

9
W. W. Rostow memorandum to the Secretary of State,
February 13, 1964, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:310-311.
■^National Security Action Memorandum, March 1964, in;
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 2:459.
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Therefore, with the continuing political instability of
the South and the gains of the Viet Cong in the countryside,
the hope for continued American withdrawal dissipated.

11

NSAM 288 served as a guideline of future policy debates re
garding Vietnam.
High administration officials met in Honolulu on June 1
and 2, 1964 to confer about South Vietnam's predicament and
America's responsibilities.

The participants concluded that

"our point of departure is and must be that we cannot accept
[the] overrunning of Southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peiping."

12

Prior to his death, MacArthur had alerted Kennedy to A f r 
ica's delicate position in Vietnam.

"Our chickens are all

coming home to roost," MacArthur warned, "and you are in
the chicken house." 13

But this was no longer true and John^-

son grasped that "Vietnam and the consequences of Diem's
murder" were now his concern.^

According to Maxwell Taylor,

"Diem's overthrow set in motion a sequence of crises . . .
over the next two years which eventually forced President
Johnson in 1965 to choose between accepted defeat or

■^George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United
States and Vietnam, revised edition (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1969), p. 153.
12

Department of State Memorandum, in Gravel, Pentagon
Papers, 3:172.
13

Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing
Line (New York: Funk and Wagralls, 1968), p. 371.
1A

Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 62.
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introducing combat t r o o p s . I n

order to discern why the

option of sending troops to Vietnam was eventually favored,
a brief discussion of Johnson and the men he relied upon is
imperative.
2. The Johnson Administration's
World View
Before Johnson became Vice President he was hailed as
an astute politician of the Senate, where his savvy in do
mestic politics shone and awed his colleagues.

In foreign

affairs, however, he was very much a part of that generation
which had learned the so-called "lessons" of the 1930s and
the failure of appeasement.

To him, these lessons were

simply reinforced by the Cold War.

The fundamental problem

in the twentieth century, Johnson reasoned, was aggression.
His tenure as Vice President did not free him from this
superficial knowledge of foreign affairs.

Kennedy bequeathed

to Johnson not only his policies but also his key advisers.
Uncertain and ill-prepared in the intricacies of international politics, Johnson relied heavily upon his advisers.
Johnson's chief advisers, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, the
Bundys, and Rostow, all espoused the basic principles of the
^Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares, p. 302.
■^Robert Sellen, "Old Assumptions versus New Realities:
Lyndon Johnson and Foreign Policy," International Journal 38
(Spring 1973):205-229. See also Henry Brandon, Anatomy of
Error: The Inside Story of the Asian War on the Potomac,
1954-1969 (Boston: Gambit, 1969).
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generation "born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace.”

17

Their assumptions

were firmly grounded in Cold War perceptions of the world:
the futility of appeasement, the danger of unchecked aggres
sion, and the hostility of the communist world.

Townsend

Hoopes, a former Pentagon official and scholar, stated "All
carried in their veins the implicitly unlimited commitment
to global struggle against Revolutionary Communism which
had grown out of their total immersion in World War II."

18

From this perspective, a communist gain anywhere upset the
world’s balance of power in favor of Moscow and Peking.
Rusk cogently expressed these sentiments shared by Johnson
and his staff:
The free world must prevent the Communists
from extending their sway through force,
whether through frontal assault, piecemeal
territorial grabs, or infiltration of men
and arms across frontiers. We will con
tinue to do our part to make aggression not
only unprofitable to the Communists but in
creasingly costly and dangerous to t h e m .
According to Rusk, one’s vision of the future world Order
constituted the pivotal international issue:

it was a struggle

between "the world laid out in the United Nations Charter .

17

John F. Kennedy, as cited in Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 276.

18

Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York:
David McKay Company, 1969), p. 16.
19

Dean Rusk, "Why We Treat Communist Countries Differ
ently," Department of State Bulletin 50 (March 16, 1964):
391.
'
“
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[and] a world constructed around some notion of a Communist
world revolution."

20

As conditions in Vietnam worsened,

the administration gradually feared that the outcome of
this struggle would be decided in the jungles of Southeast
Asia.
Since the future of the world order was at stake, the
communist threat remained the constant, even as the source
of concern,shifted from Moscow to Peking or to Hanoi.
Despite recent indications of a widening gap between China
and Russia and an easing of tensions between Russia and the
United States, Washington persisted in its view that the
communist threat remained dangerous, formidable, and world21
wide.
"There can be no full and lasting detente between
the chief Communist states and the free world," Rusk as
serted, "without settlement of critical and dangerous
issues, such as . . . the aggression against Laos and South
Viet-Nam."

22

In fact, the Sino-Soviet split accentuated

American concern, since Moscow could no longer curb Peking's
militancy.

The Secretary of Defense concluded that "success

in Viet-Nam would be regarded by Peiping as vindication for

20

Dean Rusk, "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru
ary 7," Department of State Bulletin 50 ( F e b r u a r y 14, 1964):
275.
21
See 0. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: "The Great Game"
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), and Donald S.
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1962).
22Dean Rusk, "Foreign Policy and the American Citizen,"
Department of State Bulletin 49 (December 30, 1963):994.
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China's views in the worldwide ideological struggle."

23

McNamara added that:
For Hanoi, the immediate objective is
limited: conquest of the South and na
tional unification . . . for Peiping,
however, Hanoi's victory would only be
a first step toward eventual Chinese
hegemony over the two Viet-Nams and
Southeast Asia and toward exploitation
of the new strategy in other parts of
the world.24
In 1947, the President of the United States perceived the
Soviet Union to be the greatest threat to world peace, but
years of crises and imprecise rhetoric had transformed the
nature of this threat as viewed from the Potomac.
The fear of the Soviets had been blurred to include
communism in general, regardless of which country espoused
its doctrines.

The following comment by Johnson aptly ex

pressed this prevalent attitude:
Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues in Hanoi
had long dreamed of controlling all of
Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. By the
end of the 1950s that dream was fading
fast. But in the period after the first
Sputnik Communists everywhere were in an
optimistic, aggressive mood. Khrushchev
boasted that the Soviets would surpass
the U.S. in production during the 1960s;
Mao Tse-tung claimed the East Wind was
prevailing over the West Wind; Castro took
control in Cuba; Moscow laid its ultimatum
for Berlin. For Ho Chi Minh, there was
unfinished business: to conquer Laos and:
South Vietnam.25
23

Robert McNamara, "U.S. Policy in Vietnam," Department
of State Bulletin 50 (April 13, 1964):566.
24Ibid.
25

Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 22.
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This passage evokes an image of gallant frontiersmen em
battled by nations of Indians:

by the Blackfeet, Sioux,

Crow, and Cheyenne simultaneously.

Though each tribe was

distinct to American pioneers the threat was all Indians
in general.

America's failure to distinguish between the

communist tribes of the twentieth century would prompt
Johnson eventually to call on the cavalry to save the day
in Southeast Asia.
3. The Road to Intervention:
A Chronology, 1964-1965
Throughout the first half of 1964, Washington’s unease
over South Vietnam's instability increased.

On January 30,

1964, General Nguyen Khanh gained power by successfully
implementing a political coup.

To its dismay, Khanh failed

to attain the political stability that Washington had hoped
for.

Rumors of coups, renewed Buddhist-Catholic friction,

and student demonstrations characterized the first six
months of Khanh's rule.

Recently appointed Ambassador to

Saigon, Maxwell Taylor, maintained that "the most important
and most intractable internal problem of South Vietnam in
meeting the Viet Cong threat is the political structure at
9ft
the national level."
Consequently, an anonymous compiler
of the so-called "Pentagon Papers" contends that for
9ft
Ambassador to Saigon Maxwell Taylor, U.S. Mission
Monthly Report, August 10, 1964, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations,
Book 3, IV.C.l., p. 89.
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Washington "the central perception was one of impending
chaos and possible failure in South Vietnam,"

27

Concurrently with the emphasis upon Saigon’s internal
decay, there were efforts to concentrate upon Hanoi’s sys
tematic aggression from the north.

Walt Rostow presented

a well-reasoned report to Johnson in December 1963, which
advocated a policy of gradual escalation to thwart Hanoi's
efforts.

28

This report represented the largely speculative

perception gaining official credence that aggression from
the north was increasing.

A State Department memo comment

ing on the first half of 1964, noted a "rise and change in
the nature of infiltration in recent months."

29

Still,

according to Taylor, the administration was "not ready to
bite the bullet and face the inevitability of either taking
military action against North Vietnam or running the very
real risk of failing disastrously in Southeast Asia."

30

But events during the next year would push the administration
over the brink.
In July 1964, Washington resumed the DESOTO (Destroyer
Patrol of North Vietnam) patrols off the coast of North
Vietnam.

At the same time South Vietnam patrol boats were

27

Anonymous editor, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 4,
IV.C.2., (b), p. 24.
28
State Department Counselor W. W. Rostow memorandum
to the President, December 1963, in Gravel, Pentagon Papers,
3:151.
29
State Department Memorandum, August 24, 1964, in
U.S.-Vietnam Relations, Book 4, IV.C.2., (b), p. 23.
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conducting raids (34~A operations) into North Vietnam.

On

August 2, 1964, three North Vietnamese P.T. boats pursued
the U.S.S. Maddox, fired upon it with torpedoes, and then
withdrew after suffering damage.

Apparently the North

Vietnamese mistook the Maddox for the South Vietnamese
patrols.

31

On August 4, an incident still clouded and

marred by controversy occurred.

The Johnson Administra

tion contended that North Vietnamese naval vessels attacked
the Maddox and the U.S.S. Turner Joy.

Collectively these

two skirmishes comprise the famous Gulf of Tonkin incident.
The United States retaliated immediately, bombing a main
North Vietnamese P.T. boat base on August fourth and fifth.
Speaking at Syracuse University on August 5, President
Johnson stressed two themes:

America's historical role dur

ing the Cold War and the insidious menace of unrestricted
aggression.

Johnson linked the recent incident to America's

resolve during previous crises.

"The challenge we face in

Southeast Asia today," he stated, "is the same challenge we
have faced with courage and . . . strength in Greece and
Turkey, in Berlin and Cuba."

32

The episode revived heartfelt

memories of the ravages of Hitler which continued to haunt
■?n

Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares, p. 327.
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 3:183-190.

32

Lyndon Johnson, "United States Takes Measures to Repel
Attack Against U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia," Department of
State Bulletin 51 (August 24, 1964):261.

140
the world.

Johnson admonished his audience not to disregard

the recent past, "Aggression
to the world.

. has unmasked its face

The world remembers -- the world must never

forget -- that aggression unchallenged is Aggression unchecked."

33

On August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf

of Tonkin Resolution by an overwhelming margin of 504 to 2.
With the resolution the duly elected representatives of the
American people authorized President Johnson to "take all
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the
forces of the United States and to prevent further aggres
sion."3^

The resolution declared that America regarded the

security of Southeast Asia "as vital to its national interests and to world peace."

35

The resolution affirmed that:

the United States is, therefore; prepared,
as the President determines, to take all
necessary steps, including the use of
force, to assist any member . . . of the
Southeast Asia Defense Treaty requesting
assistance in defense of its f r e e d o m . 3"
Thus the resolution laid the basis for subsequent action and
United States intervention in Vietnam.

Despite the later

protests of Congress, in actuality the President was given
a free hand.

According to the historian Schandler, "The

33Ibid., 51:261.
34

"Text of Joint Resolution, August 7," Department of
State Bulletin 51 (August 24, 1964):268.

35ibid.
36Ibid.
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swift reprisal and the nearly unanimous congressional sup
port demonstrated in dramatic fashion the U.S. commitment
to South Vietnam."3^
With United States retaliation and the basis for future
action approved by Congress, hopes for withdrawal receded.
Hesitation, agonized planning, and indecisiveness on the
part of the administration characterized Vietnam policy
following the Tonkin incident.

On November 6, an NSC

Working Group on South Vietnam and Southeast Asia met for
70

the first time.

The group reaffirmed the principles of

the domino theory and maintained that Vietnam constituted
a test case of America's ability to resist national wars of
liberation.

It suggested that the United States must cur

tail communist ambitions and that a failure to do so, would
undermine American prestige and power throughout the world.
The group neglected to propose any concrete program of ac
tion.

On January 27, 1965, McNamara and McGeorge Bundy ex

pressed their distaste for a continuance of a policy of in
action by urging the President to expand the role of America's
military power in Vietnam:
37

Herbert Y. Schandler, The Unmaking of a President:
Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton: Princeton. University
Press, 1977), p. 5.
70

"NSC Working Group on SVN/SEA," in Gravel, Pentagon
Papers, 3:210. The members: Assistant Secretary of State
William Bundy; Marshall Green and Michael Forrestal from
the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Robert Johnson from the
Policy Planning Council; John McNaughton from Defense; Vice
Admiral Lloyd Murlin of the JCS; and Harold Ford from the
CIA.
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Both of us understand the very grave ques
tions presented by any decision of this
sort. . . . Both of Us have fully sup
ported your unwillingness . . . to move
out of the middle course. We both agree
that every effort should still be made
to improve our operations on the ground
and to prop up the authorities in South
Vietnam. . . . But we are both convinced
that none of this is enough and the time
has come for harder decision.^9
At 2:00 a.m. on the morning of February 7, 1965, a Viet Cong
raid upon the barracks of American advisers in Pleiku would
jolt Johnson from his lethargy and policy of holding the
line.

Nine United States soldiers were killed and the num

ber of wounded and severe damage to equipment made it the
heaviest communist assault on American installations in
South Vietnam.

Washington responded with a reprisal raid

upon North Vietnamese barracks at Dong Hoi, a guerrilla
training garrison forty miles north of the 17th parallel.
The planned and executed one-time tit-for-tat reprisal,
code named FLAMING DART, precipitated the transformation of
the nature of the war.

40

As Taylor indicated "a new phase

of the war had begun" with the removal of the restrictions
placed upon America's air power.^

7Q

Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream
(New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 260.
40

National Security Council Meeting, February 6, in
Gravel, Pentagon Papers. 3:286, 302. The NSC meeting con
cerning the February 7 attack on Pleiku took place on
February 6, Washington time.
^Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares, p. 335.
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Unlike the reprisal following the Tonkin incident, and
despite the original plan, the February 1965 raids were not
considered as one-shot operations, the raids gradually
changed the ground rules of the war.

The sustained bombing

policy escalated the war and tied America closer to the in
terests of South Vietnam.

A February 7

White House press re

lease linked America's counter-measures to Hanoi's behavior:
these attacks were only made possible by the
continuing infiltratonn of personnel and
equipment from North Vietnam . . . infiltra
tion markedly increased during 1964. . . .
'The key to the situation remains the cessa
tion of infiltration from North Vietnam and
the clear indication that it is prepared to
cease aggression against its n e i g h b o r s . 1 42
Reporting from Vietnam on February 7, McGeorge Bundy re
ported that like it or not, America's prestige was tied to
South Vietnam, hence he recommended a policy of sustained
reprisal.^

Bundy professed that "the situation in Vietnam

is deteriorating, and without new U.S. action, defeat ap
pears inevitable.
but not much."

44

. . . There is still time to turn around,
During an NSC meeting on February 8,

Johnson decided to reverse the current trend.

With only

Vice President Hubert Humphrey in dissent, the NSC approved
a policy of suistained reprisal and graduated pressure against

^ White House Press Release, February 7, 1964, in
Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 3:304-305.
43

McGeorge Bundy, as cited in Kearns, Johnson, p. 261.
44
McGeorge Bundy, as cited in Johnson, Vantage Point,
p. 126.
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Hanoi.4^

Under Secretary of State George Ball reflected the

administration's resolve:
This was a test of the will, a clear chal
lenge to the political purpose of both the
United States and South Vietnamese govern
ments.
It was a test and challenge there
fore which we could not fail to respond
to . . . without misleading the North Viet
namese to our intent and the strength of
our purpose to carry out that intent.46
On February 10, the Viet Gong attacked a United States en
listed men’s billet in Qui Nhon.

Within twenty-four hours,

American and South Vietnamese aircraft accomplished the
largest retaliatory raid to that date.

The raid was not

linked to the immediate incident, but to Hanoi's behavior
in general.
On February 15, 1965, Johnson formally approved a bomb
ing program, project ROLLING THUNDER, which transformed the
reprisal concept into a sustained graduated bombing opera
tion.

Bundy’s recommendation of February 7, that "once a pro

gram of reprisals is clearly underway, it should not be neces
sary to connect each specific act against North Vietnam to a
particular outrage in the South" had been adopted as policy.4 '
7

4^Hubert H. Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man: My
Life and Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company,
1976), pp. 318-324.
46George Ball, as cited in Alexander George, David K.
Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy:
Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company* 1971),
p. 163.
4^Paper by McGeorge Bundy, Annex A, "A Policy of Sus
tained Reprisal," in Gravel, Pentagon Papers, 3:688.
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Within a month, America's first ground combat units were
committed to Vietnam.

On March 8, 350G United States Marines

landed on the shores of Da Nang with an assignment to pro
tect its airfield against the Viet Cong.

During another

high-level conference at Honolulu on April 20, their mis
sion was transformed and expanded.

The United States adopted

an enclave strategy which stationed American troops in key
South Vietnamese cities.

48

But this defensive and static use

of American troops combined with air power proved insufficient.
By early June, General Westmoreland, the top military com
mander in Vietnam, requested permission to grant offensive
responsibilities to the United States troops.
decision had come for Johnson.

The time of

As Johnson said himself:

I knew we faced a crucial question. . . .
If necessary would we use substantial U.S.
forces on the ground to prevent the loss
of that region to aggressive forces moving
illegally across international frontiers.49
Johnson therefore consulted with his advisers, Congressional
leaders, and trusted friends from July 21 to 27 as he de
liberated whether to commit troops to Vietnam on a massive
scale.
4. The Crossroad of Decision
During those high-level meetings of that crucial week in
July, as Johnson ruminated over America's options, much more
48
49

Schandler, Unmaking of a President, pp. 21-28.
Johnson, yantage Point, p. 144.
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than the recent events in Vietnam weighed upon his mind.
Johnson's attitudes toward history, the United States, the
communist threat, and of world politics could not be
severed from the specifics of Vietnam.

Taken together with

the deterioration of South Vietnam, these attitudes would
prove compelling.
Like Truman and the others before him, Johnson and the
majority of his advisers took the lessons of the 1930s,
symbolized by the futility of appeasement at Munich, to
heart.

Visions of another reign of terror sweeping the

world tormented them relentlessly.

Aggression, especially

when practiced by communists, vividly recalled these deeply
imprinted memories.

To Johnson and his generation these

lessons were not mere historical abstractions, rather they
possessed a profound emotional and lasting quality.

Harry

McPherson, a member of Johnson's staff, described Johnson
as having
come to political maturity in the late
thirties, when fascist power threatened
the world; the threat of Russian power
followed; there, never had been a time,
from his election to the House to his
ascension to the Presidency when the
democracies were not threatened by some
body. He had no doubt about the human
evil of communism, nor about Soviet and
Chinese aggressiveness.50
Johnson may stand corrected but his tendency to view events in
Vietnam via the prism of his experience is understandable.
■^Harry C. McPherson, A Political Education (Boston:
Atlantic Monthly, Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 445.
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The administration, especially Dean Rusk, feared that
as World War II faded in people's minds, its costly lessons
would be forgotten.

Rusk confided to a historian from

Columbia University, Henry Graff, that Article I of the
United Nations Charter and its goal of preventing aggres
sion was becoming a relic of the past.

"Few people read

that article, which drew together the lessons of experience
of my generation.

It is the only guide we have to prevent

World War III."^1

Aggression feeds on itself; therefore

violent change in Southeast Asia threatened America's in
terests throughout the world.

America's Ambassador to the

Federal Republic of Germany, George G. McGhee, aptly
expressed this sentiment:
Freedom is . . .indivisible; what happens
in the Mekong Valley Can have an important
bearing on what happens in Berlin. Aggres
sion anywhere must be made so expensive
that those tempted to indulge in it will
see the folly of their c o u r s e . 52
According to Rusk, Southeast Asia was the scene of a critical,
historical dilemma, "that is, whether a course of aggression
is going to be allowed to move ahead and whether appetites
will be allowed to grow upon feeding."

53

^ D e a n Rusk, as cited in Henry F. Graff, The Tuesday
Cabinet: Deliberation and Decision on Peace and War under
Lyndon B. Johnson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1970), pp. 134-135.
52

George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current
Issues," Department of State Bulletin 51 (August 3, 1964):139.
53

Dean Rusk, "A Conversation with Dean Rusk," Department
of State Bulletin 52 (January 18, 1965)
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This fear of aggression was neither confined to histori
cal lessons

or to emotional reactions.

communists,

especially that of the People's Republic of

China, alarmed Washington.

The behavior of the

On April 7, at Johns Hopkins

University, President Johnson gave expression to this con
cern when he said that "over this war -- and all Asia -is another reality:
China.The

the deepening shadow of Communist

Sino-Soviet split heightened America's

apprehensions regarding China and increased the stakes in
Vietnam.

Washington dreaded a struggle between Moscow and

Peking over
governments.

who represented the vanguard of revolutionary
Consequently,

the administration feared a

vindication of China's militancy on the battlefields of .
Vietnam.

Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far

Eastern Affairs, stated:
The 'wars of national liberation* approach
has been adopted as an essential element of
Communist China’s expansionistic policy.
If
this technique adopted by Hanoi should be
allowed to succeed in Viet-Nam, we would be
confirming Peiping's contention that mili
tant revolutionary struggle is a more pro
ductive Communist path than Moscow's doc
trine of peaceful coexistence.55
Maxwell Taylor, William Bundy, and Dean Rusk soon echoed this
attitude publicly.

Rusk mapped out the consequences Of the

loss of South Vietnam forcefully:
54Lyndon Johnson, "Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia,"
Department of State Bulletin 52 (April 26, 1965):606.
"^Leonard Unger, "Present Objectives and Future Possibili
ties in Southeast Asia," Department of State Bulletin 52
(May 10, 1965):713.
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I should think they would simply move the
problem to the next country and the next
and the next. And, as I say, this is not
dominoes. This is Marxism. This is the
kind of Marxism which comes out of Peiping,
I mean it's all there to see. They make no
secret of it,56
America's confidence in the purity of its motives and in
its power encouraged the administration to meet the communist
challenge in Southeast Asia with force.
In 1965, most of the administration's officials shared
a common faith in America's capabilities.

"People ought to

know how strong the United States is, the Secretary of Defense boasted.

57

Washington assumed America's power would

ultimately prevail and that other people would fold before
America's military might.
this viewpoint.

58

Recent events had legitimized

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United

States had coerced a powerful foe to abandon its aggressive
designs.

If the powerful Soviets shuddered before America's

strength, how could little Hanoi withstand an onslaught of
American force?
Although the immediate impact of the Missile Crisis was
beneficial, its legacy proved to be mixed.

Tensions between

the Soviet Union and the United States eased, but Kennedy's
advisers also drew simple and dangerous lessons Concerning
5^Dean Rusk, Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem
ber 23," Department of State Bulletin 52 (January 11, 1965):
39.
:
:
57

Robert McNamara, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet,

p. 73.
58George, Coercive Diplomacy, p. 147.
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the use of force from the crisis.

Kennedy's handling of the

crisis left an impression that the use of force to pressure
an adversary was an effective and legitimate tool of di
plomacy.

Forgotten was the anguish, uncertainty, and ten

sion prevalent throughout the crisis.

According to a

leading specialist on coercive diplomacy, Alexander George,
this tactic "requires skill in tailoring the strategy to the
59
special configuration of a particular situation."
In other
words, general principles of coercion could not be easily or
simply drawn from an intricate and unique crisis.

But despite

Kennedy's counsel, his advisers derived improper conclusions
from the President's diplomatic maneuvers during the crisis.^
Consequently, without appreciating the delicate nature of
coercive diplomacy, the Kennedy-Johnson administration be
came enthralled and enthusiastic about its unlimited potential
in resolving international conflicts.

This contributed to

the willingness to use force to break Hanoi's will and attain
America's objectives in Vietnam.
Johnson and his advisers were convinced that American
power would force Hanoi to abandon its aggressive policy,
accept the status quo, and negotiate accordingly.

Bill

Moyers, Johnson's Press Secretary, claims Johnson held the
"conviction that we can see this thing through, that limited
objectives with maximum resources can prevail."

f\

1

Or as

59ibid., p. 230.
6°Ibid., pp. x-xi.
GlBill Moyers, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet, p. 108.
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Johnson colorfully remarked, the United States had "to apply
the maximum deterrent till he £Ho Chi Minh] sobers up and
unloads his pistol."

62

Whatever qualms Washington had regarding the use of
force in Vietnam were eased by its duties and responsibili
ties as the leader of the free world.

America's mission and

power justified the implementation of its awesome power.
McGeorge Bundy reflected on America's role in world affairs
since 1947 to Henry Graff:
Bundy said he had come to accept also what he
had learned from Dean Acheson
that, in
the final analysis, the United States was
the locomotive at the head of mankind, and
the rest of the world the caboose--meaning,
I thought, that he was not expressing
chauvinism but simply passing judgment on
the usefulness to the world of American
energies.63
The hope was that American energy could transform defeat into
victory in Vietnam.
From July 21 to 27, the administration deliberated upon
McNamara's report which stated in cool logic that only a mas
sive commitment of United States ground troops could stem the
tide and achieve victory in Vietnam.

Finally, the moment of

truth rested upon the shoulders of one man: Lyndon Baines
Johnson.

62

"When a President makes a decision," Johnson later

Lyndon Johnson, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet,

p. 54.
McGeorge Bundy, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet,
p. 48.
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reflected, "he seeks all the information he can get.

At the

same time, he cannot separate himself from his own experi
ence and m e m o r y . J o h n s o n ' s personal experiences bore
directly upon his decision to intervene in Vietnam:
You see, I deeply believe we are quar
antining over there just like the smallpox.
Just like FDR and Hitler, just like Wiison
and the Kaiser. You've simply got to see
this thing in historical perspective. What
I learned as a boy in my teens and in
college about World War I was that it was
our lack of strength and failure to show
stamina that got us into the war. I was
taught that the Kaiser never would have
made his moves if he hadn't been able to
count Uncle Sam out because he believed
we'd never come in. Then I was taught in
Congress . . . on defense preparedness and
by FDR that we in Congress were constantly
telegraphing the wrong messages to Hitler
and the Japanese •
that the Wheelers, the
Lindberghs, the LaFollet.tes, and the America
Firsters were letting Hitler know he could
move without worrying about Uncle Sam.
I
remember those days in Congress.
Johnson was determined that Ho and other communists would read
America's message loud and clear.

The President expressed

misgivings that similar inaction on his part would create a
world climate similar to the one prior to World War II, "every
thing I knew about history told me if I got out of Vietnam and
let Ho . . . run through the streets of Saigon, then I'd be
doing exactly what Chamberlain did.in World War II.

64

Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 46.

^Lyndon Johnson, as cited in Kearns, Johnson, pp. 329330.
66Ibid., pp. 252-253.
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Johnson added, "I'd be giving a big fat reward to aggfession,"

67

but this was an anathema to a generation raised

on war and international tensions.

On July 28, 1965,

President Lyndon Johnson approved McNamara’s recommendation
to commit on a massive scale American ground troops to Viet
nam and thus raised America's troop level to 125,000.
America's Ambassador to Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge,
cabled to Washington his reaction to the presence of United
States troops:
I wish I could describe the feeling of
hope which this great American presence is
bringing. There can no longer be the
slightest doubt that persistence will bring
success, that the aggression will be warded
off and that for the first time since the
end of World War II, the cause of free men
will be on the upward spiral.68
Past experience had ill-prepared America for the possibility
that its mighty locomotive would be derailed in the jungles
of Vietnam;

67Ibid., p. 253!
fi ft

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, as cited in Gravel,
Pentagon Papers, 2:366.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
I believe that the Soviet has so often
repeated the incorrect statement that
we are planning to attack him, that he ,
has finally begun to believe it himself.
Douglas MacArthur
1. Lessons of the Past
A crucial element which influenced American policy in
Korea and Vietnam was the refraction of the lessons of the
recent past through a prism of American perceptions of its
adversaries and of itself.

Traumatic events often penetrate

deep into the recesses of the mind and come to color every
aspect of life and sometimes to dominate an era of history.
One need only think of the effect upon European civiliza
tion of the destruction of its youth in the trenches of
World War I.

Erich Maria Remarque in All Quiet on the Western

Front captured the profound bewilderment of a generation:
And men will not understand us - - for the
generation that grew up before us, though it
has passed these years with us already had
a home and a calling; now it will return to
its old occupations, and the war will be for
gotten -- and the generation that has grown
iDouglas MacArthur, as cited in MacArthur Hearings, 1:6.
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up after us will be strange to us and
push us aside. We will be superfluous
even to ourselves, we will, grow older,
a few will adapt themselves, some others
will merely submit, and most will be be
wildered; -- the years will pass by and
in the end we shall fall into ruin.^
Thirty years later war once again ravaged the European con
tinent inflicting its horrors upon another generation.

Whereas

World War I left in its wake a shocked and spiritually dead
generation and one resigned to its fate, the survivors of
World War II energetically dedicated themselves to construct
a new world order which would wipe the horrors of the
twentieth century from the earth.

For the postwar American

statesmen the touchstone of their experience was the West's
abject failure to prevent Hitler from embarking upon his
madman's schemes.

The leaders of the United States dedicated

themselves to the proposition that such an occurrence would
not happen again.
To a world recently subjected to the brutality of a
world war and sensitized to the dangers of unchecked aggres
sion, the postwar behavior of the Soviet Union appeared
omninous indeed.

The abstract and emotional lessons of the

past decade were now joined with a concrete threat:
Russia.

communist

The symbolic leader of the Munich generation, Winston

Churchill, once again alerted the West.

?
Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front
(Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1956),
p. 254.
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Last time«I saw it all coming and cried
aloud to my own fellow-countrymen and to
the world, but no one paid attention. Up
till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany
might have been saved from the awful fate
which has overtaken her and we might have
been spared the miseries Hitler let loose
upon mankind. There never was a war in
all history easier to prevent by timely
action than the. one that has just desolved
such great areas of the globe.
It could
have been prevented in my belief without
the firing of a single shot, . . . but no
one would listen and one by one we were
all sucked into the awful whirl pool.
The next time storm clouds gathered over the horizon the
West and the United States would be ready.
From 1947 to 1950, the
effort

United States concentrated its

of containing Soviet expansion on the Europeancon

tinent, responding with precise and limited programs such
as the Marshall Plan.

In this atmosphere of superpower

confrontation, the return of French colonial rule to Indo
china seemed of little consequence.

There were those in

government who asserted that the ambitions of the Soviets
were unlimited and who perceived all Soviet acts and policy
as integral to its coherent plan for world domination.
68 is a case in point.

NSC

This view gained official credence

and sanction after the events of June 24, 1950.
With the dramatic and unexpected invasion of South Korea,
the supposition that the Soviets harbored ambitions of world
Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace," March 5,
1946, Winston S. Churchill; His Complete Speeches, 1897^1963; Volume VII, 1943-1949. ed. Robert Rhodes James, 8
vols. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974) :72927293.
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domination became an evident truth.

The Chinese interven

tion merely accentuated American fears of an aggressive
communist bloc and transformed the containment policy into
a global venture.

The failure to distinguish between the

varieties of communism in Asia would shape American policy
accordingly.
In conjunction with the pervasive fear of the Soviet
Union and communism, American decision makers viewed them
selves and their policies as instruments of the forces of
light battling with the forces of dark.

As leader of the

free world it was America's duty to ensure world peace and
to prevent the outbreak of World War III.

This purity of

motive obscurred the implications of American policy.

Con

sequently, Washington often failed to anticipate that.other
nations would interpret its acts as hostile and threatening.
Truman’s sealing off Formosa and approval of the march to
the Yalu are only two examples.

Therefore when China did

intervene, the Truman Administration perceived it as part
of a well-coordinated counterattack planned by the Soviet
Union and not as a nationalistic response to the policy of
the United States.

The prevailing perception of an aggres

sive monolithic communism combined with America's pristine
self-image would have profound implications for United States
policy in Southeast Asia.
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2. Korea and Vietnam: A Comparison
Despite the differences in the nature of the Korean and
Vietnamese conflicts, the administrations which favored in
tervention perceived the fundamental issues at stake as being
identical.

The outbreak of hostilities on June 24, 1950,

cannot be equated with the Gulf of Tonkin incident nor the
mortar attack on Pleiku, yet the administrations of both
Truman and Johnson considered the two wars in essentially
the same way.

Though lacking the drama of a frontal assault,

Washington viewed the aggression against South Vietnam to be
as formidable and threatening to world peace as the invasion
of Korea.

As Rusk testified in 1966:

"We fought the Korean

War, which like the struggle in Viet-Nam occurred in a remote
area thousands of miles away, to sustain a principle vital to
the freedom and security of America."^
"Korea was not a civil war.

He later reflected,

In Vietnam the issue is the same

one of aggression as in the cases of national frontiers that
are well established.

Aggression is at the heart of the

i s s u e . T h e r e f o r e though one conflict was a conventional
war supported by allied action while the other was a prolonged
conflict nearly devoid of allied support, the response of the
United States in both instances was intervention.

The wars

of national liberation were perceived to be as pernicious as

^Dean Rusk, "The U.S. Commitment in Vietnam: Fundamental
Issues," Department of State Bulletin 54 (March 7, 1966):348.
5Dean Rusk, as cited in Graff, Tuesday Cabinet, p. 136.
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a frontal assault.

Both had to be stopped.

America's designated role as leader of the free world
required a united effort, or if need be unilateral action,
against communist aggression.

The lessons of Munich and the

Cold War formulated the common dominator and perspective
from which the two conflicts were examined.

In 1950, a North

Korean invasion was perceived as synonymous with aggression
instigated by the Soviet Union and communism.

America's

fears were accentuated by the Chinese intervention and by
increased communist activity in Asia.

Even as American

leaders slowly acknowledged, with great reluctance, the
Sino-Soviet split and other indications of factionalism in
the communist world, in times of crises the general fear of
communism showed its head.

Though the source of the immedi

ate communist threat shifted from Moscow to Peking, or even
to Hanoi, the fear of communism in general remained steadfast.
Communism was by its nature aggressive.

Dean Rusk remarked:

I have noted criticism of the so-called
analogy between Hitler and Mao Tse-tung. .
. . We do ourselves no service by insisting
that each source of aggression is unique.
My own view is that we have learned a good
deal about this phenomena and its poten
tiality for leading into catastrophe if
the problem is not met in timely fashion.
Regardless of the variety of faces in which it may appear,
aggression was aggression.

Consequently,, when both adminis

trations perceived aggression by communists their options were

^Dean Rusk, "United States Policy Toward Communist China,"
Department of State Bulletin 54 (May 2, 1966):698.
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considered limited.

Johnson later revealed that "I realized

that doing nothing was worse than doing something."

7

Both

Truman and Johnson felt compelled to commit American ground
forces to Asia.
The momentum of military operations in shaping subse
quent policy is common to the two conflicts.

The original

purpose to repel the North Korean invasion and to restore
the ante bellum status quo eventually fell victim to the
administration's vision of a unified Korea.

MacArthur's

magnificent victory at Inchon presented Washington with a
golden opportunity for a clear-cut success.

Not to capitalize

on the recent turn of events seemed an act of supreme folly.
Hence, despite the warnings of the People's Republic of China,
Truman authorized United Nations troops to cross the 38th
parallel and to push toward the Yalu.
Though lacking the swiftness of momentous decisions
associated with Korea, nevertheless a pattern of military
momentum can be ascertained in respect to American policy
in Vietnam.

Until 1961, America restricted it's support of

Vietnam to economic and military aid.

From this commitment

of its prestige, the United States eventually sent military
advisers to Vietnam, planned covert operations, and sent
bombing missions into North Vietnam in reprisal for the P.T.
boat strikes in the Gulf of Tonkin.

7

The limited nature of

Lyndon Johnson, as cited in Kearns, Johnson, p. 263.
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the reprisal to the Tonkin incident gave way with the attack
upon Pleiku to a policy of sustained, graduated pressure
bombing of North Vietnam.

Finally, the troops sent to pro

tect American air bases were assigned offensive missions and
reinforced by the massive introduction of American ground
forces.

Superficially the pattern of increased military

involvement appears planned or inevitable, but none of the
steps were irreversible.

A reversal may have required an

act of statesmanship but Anwar Sadat's later "sacred mission"
to Israel in 1978 was deemed unthinkable until it happened.
3. Conclusion
This observation by Dean Rusk is representative of the
attitude that characterized American policy in Asia from
Truman to Johnson:

"The situation we face in Southeast Asia

is obviously complex but, in my view, the underlying issues
are relatively simple and are utterly fundamental."

8

America's

reading of the recent past, the omnipresence of the ghosts of
Hitler and Stalin, and the genuine concern over the inten
tions of the Soviet Union captured the imagination of the
American people and their leaders.

As the issue of slavery

dominated almost every aspect of life in the United States
during the mid-1800s, so also the thirties and the early Cold
War shaped the mood of subsequent decades.

The perception

8
Dean Rusk, "The U.S. Commitment in Vietnam: Fundamental
Issues," Department of State Bulletin 54 (March 7, 19(56-): 34-7.
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that the world was a battleground between the forces of free
dom and slavery hardened and crystallized.
The outbreak of war in Korea transformed this ideologi
cal struggle into a physical battle.

Communism now was seen

as posing a global threat to America's interests and security.
All other concerns receded to the background and issues such
as Vietnamese history and independence were not given the
attention they warranted.

Truman perceived the invasion of

Korea and China's intervention as part of a larger scheme of
communist expansion:

"We are seeing a pattern in Indo-China

and Tibet timed to coincide with the attack in Korea as a
g
challenge to the Western world."
The tendency to view the
world through a bipolar lens would blur America's vision,
blinding its leaders from appreciating the unique aspects
and qualities of the Vietnamese conflict.

Unfortunately,

nuance and complexity were not recognized as attributes dur
ing the height of the Cold War and American leaders preferred
solids such as black and white over shades of gray.
In 1947, Dean Acheson compared the Cold War to the
struggle between Cathage and Rome.

We know Rome eventually

prevailed in its war against Carthage.

Rome's victory may

have spelled its gradual decline as a vibrant civilization
and world power.

By concentrating on external threats Rome

lost its inner strength; by becoming an empire obsessed with
total security, Rome lost the spirit which had guided its
9

Truman, Memoirs, 2:381.
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republic.

The democracy of Athens fell victim to this com

mon affliction.

A careful re-reading of the "Melian Dialogue,"

reveals that any cause, however intrinsically just or moral,
can degenerate into a policy of expediency or a fascination
with power.
Quite understandably, the ghost of Hitler and then
Stalin haunted the postwar world.

In fact, the historian

Ernest May suggests that for a generation of American states
men the proclivity to compare the acts of Hitler with the
aggressions in Korea and Vietnam was probably "inescapable.
The ideological hostilities of the Cold War reinforced this
tendency.
Philip Caputo's memoir of his experience as a young
marine stationed in Vietnam indicates in human terms the
dangers of policies justified in moral abstractions and
absolutes. 11

As did many of America's leaders, the ordinary

citizen also became imprisoned by its own perceptions and
rhetoric.

Seduced by the idealism of John F. Kennedy's

speeches, Caputo's beliefs--and perhaps those of the nation-were shattered in the jungles of Southeast Asia.

In part,

this was due to the failure of American statesmen to probe
deeply the lessons of the past.

^®May, "L e s s o n s p. 85.
11

In 1963, John F. Cady warned

See also p. 113.

Philip Caputo, A Rumor of War (New York: Holt, Rine
hart and Winston, 1977).
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that the United States must 'View both American policy and
the Communist threat through Southeast Asia eyes, however
difficult and sometimes painful this process may be."

12

Caputo's ordeal attests that America's failure to broaden
its perspective was ultimately mdre painful.

"^John P. Cady, "The Historical Background of United
States Policy in Southeast Asia*" in Southeast Asia: Problens of United States Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT
Preds, 1963)/p. 25. " ’
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